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Schiefelbein: Accepting an Exception to the "Government Contacts Exception" of

ACCEPTING AN EXCEPTION TO TILE
"GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION"
OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA'S
LONG-ARM STATUTE
I. INTRODUCTION

Personal jurisdiction over a defendant is one of the most fundamental
procedural requirements for adjudicating a lawsuit in any court.' Absent
personal jurisdiction, a court will not have the power to entertain a plaintiff's
claim(s) against a defendant. 2 Hence, the lawsuit will be deemed improper
before that court, and it will be dismissed on procedural grounds.'
Within the last five decades, the personal jurisdiction calculus has
undergone extensive change. 4 From its indoctrination in Pennoyer v. Nefi to

1. See JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIvIL PROCEDURE, § 3.1, at 94-95 (2d ed. 1993).
Personal jurisdiction is defined as the power that a court has over a person or property in order to
adjudicate a plaintiff's claim(s) against that person. Id. In addition to personal jurisdiction, a court
must also have subject matter jurisdiction which is defined as the power to hear certain types of
claims. Id. See also FLEMING JAMES, JR. ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE, § 1.16, at 37-8 (4th ed.
1992) (defining personal and subject matter jurisdiction and the requirements of each). While
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is usually acquired through the employment of
a long-arm statute, see infra section H.B. I., subject matter jurisdiction is based on a variety of
criteria depending on whether the particular court is state or federal. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1988) (authorizing federal question subject matter jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988)
(authorizing federal diversity subject matter jurisdiction); and 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1988) (authorizing
federal supplemental jurisdiction .of state claims). For a general discussion of both personal
jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction, see DAVID CRUMP ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 63-267
(1992).
2. See FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., supra note 1, § 3.1, at 94-95; JAMES Er AL., supra note 1, §
1.16, at 37-38.
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(2) (Puthorizing a motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction).
See FRIEDENTHAL Er AL., supra note 1, § 5.24, at 301 (stating that claims which are defective for
jurisdictional purposes can be challenged under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure).
4. See FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 1, §§ 3.10-3.12, at 120-41 (tracing the modern day
refinements to the personal jurisdiction calculus); CRUMP ET AL., supra note 1, at 63-143
(documenting the history of the personal jurisdiction calculus through comment and case law); James
S. Cochran, Note, PersonalJurisdictionand the Joinder of Claims in he Federal Courts, 64 TEX.
L. REV. 1463, 1463 (1986) (noting some of the evolutionary aspects of personal jurisdiction).
5. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). Pennoyer was the first case that set forth what has been termed the
"physical presence rule." The rule allows a court to assert personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant provided that the non-resident defendant was either physically present or the non-resident's
property was physically located in the particular state when service was processed. Id. at 722.
However, as society became more advanced, the controversies grew correspondingly, and the ability
to serve process on an individual became increasingly difficult as travel became more extensive.
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its two-pronged "minimum contacts" test developed in InternationalShoe Co.
v. Washington,6 the theory of personal jurisdiction has progressed into one of
the most widely commented-on doctrines in civil procedure today.7 While the
Supreme Court has fashioned much of the basic theory of personal jurisdiction,
several variations of this basic theory have been employed by both state and
federal enactments of long-arm statutes and the judicial gloss interpreting those
statutes.8
A specific example of such a variation can be seen in the District of
Columbia. Unique to the District of Columbia is the "government contacts

See McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (discussing the evolution
of personal jurisdiction); Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 250-51 (1958) (same). Multi-state
disputes began to arise more frequently and as such, the simplistic "physical presence" rule became
inadequate. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51. Consequently, a more
modernized jurisdiction rule was needed. See McGee, 355 U.S. at 222-23; Hanson, 357 U.S. at
250-5 1. The Supreme Court's solution was the advent of the "minimum contacts" test. See McGee,
355 U.S. at 222-23; Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51. See also infra § ll.A. (discussing the major cases
in the evolution of the personal jurisdiction theory). For a more detailed historical analysis of the
personal jurisdiction theory and of Pennoyer, see FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, §§ 3.2-3.3,
at 95-99.
6. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). For a detailed discussion of the "minimum contacts" test, see infra
section H.
7. See, e.g., GEOFFERY C. HAZARD, JR. & JAN VETTER, PERSPECTIVES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
(1987); William VanDercreek, Jurisdiction Over the Person - The Progeny of Pennoyer and the
Future of Asahi, 13 NOVA L. REV. 1287 (1989); Wendy Collins Perdue, Sin, Scandal, and
Substantive Due Process: PersonalJurisdictionand Pennoyer Reconsidered, 62 WASH. L. REV.
479 (1987); Stanley E. Cox, Would That Burnham Had Not Come to be Done Insane! A Critique
of Recent Supreme Court Personal Jurisdiction Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient
Presence Jurisdiction Is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts About Divorce Jurisdiction in a
Minimum Contacts World, 58 TENN. L. REV. 497 (1991); R. Lawrence Dessem, Personal
Jurisdiction Afier Asahi: The Other (International)Shoe Drops, 55 TENN. L. REV. 41 (1987);
Stewart Jay, Minimum Contacts as a Unified Theory of PersonalJurisdiction: A Reappraisal, 59
N.C. L. REV. 429 (1981); Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the ConstitutionalLaw of Personal
Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 19 (1990);
David A. Sonenshein, The Error of a Balancing Approach to the Due Process Determination of
Jurisdiction over the Person, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 47 (1986); Daan Braveman, InterstateFederalism and
Personal Jurisdiction, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 533 (1982); Martin H. Redish, Due Process,
Federalism, and PersonalJurisdiction: A Theoretical Evaluation, 75 Nw. U. L. REV. 1112 (1981);
Developments in the Law State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REV. 909 (1960).
8. See FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 1, §§ 3.10-3.12, at 120-41; CRUMP Er AL., supra note
1, at 82-91. Long-arm or "single-act" statutes are enacted in order to prescribe certain types of
conduct or events undertaken or caused by a non-resident that give rise to the forum's power to
assert personal jurisdiction over that non-resident. See FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 1, § 3.12,
at 139; JAMES Er AL., supra note 1, § 2.6, at 63. For two examples of state long-arm statutes, see
infra notes 93-94.
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exception," 9 a judicially created restraining device on the District of Columbia
long-arm statute's jurisdictional authority.'" Essentially, the exception works
to limit the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant that
is otherwise available through the District of Columbia long-arm statute."
When applied, the government contacts exception prevents the District of
Columbia from asserting personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant in
those situations where that non-resident defendant's only contacts with the
District of Columbia are those which are solely with the United States
government or a governmental agency.' 2 In such cases, the government
contacts exception exempts that non-resident defendant's contacts with the
national government or its agencies from the personal jurisdiction calculus,
thereby thwarting the exercise of personal jurisdiction over that particular nonresident defendant.' 3
This so called government contacts exception is based upon two policy
concerns: one constitutional and one prudential. 4 First, citizens have the right
to freely access the government for purposes of petitioning the national
government.' 5 Because the District of Columbia is the situs of the national
government, citizens who enter into it in order to access the nation's government
should not be deterred by the fear of exposing themselves to the jurisdictional
authority of the District of Columbia simply because they have exercised their
constitutional right." Second, if such "governmental contacts" were included

9. The "government contacts exception" is also known as the "governmental contacts
exception" or the "government contacts doctrine." This note will use the term "government contacts
exception" for sake of uniformity throughout.
10. See Hilaire H. Butler, Note, The Government Contacts Exception to the District of
Columbia Long-Arr Statute: Portraitof a Legal Morass, 36 CATH. U. L. Rzv. 745, 745 (1987).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Layne
v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1934).
15. See, e.g., Neely, 62 F.2d at 875; Layne, 71 F.2d at 224.
16. See, e.g., Neely, 62 F.2d at 875; Layne, 71 F.2d at 224. The Neely and Layne decisions,
while not expressly referring to the First Amendment, have nevertheless been interpreted as relying
on the First Amendment as the basis on which the first policy concern is premised. See Rose v.
Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1373-74 (D.C. 1978).
[We did recognize that the government contacts principle had emerged with a First
Amendment as well as a due process underpinning. We acknowledge, without holding,
that [the] Mueller Brass, [Neely, and Layne] cases had a First Amendment gloss in that
they protected one's right to petition the government for a redress of grievances, without
fear of the threat of suit if their contacts were limited to asserting that constitutional
right.
Id.
The First Amendment provides in pertinent part that: "Congress shall make no law. . . abridging
the . . . right of the people peacefully to assemble, and to petition the Government for the redress
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in the District of Columbia long-arm statute's personal jurisdiction calculus, the
District of Columbia would quickly be transformed into a national judicial center
based upon the citizenry's necessary and inevitable aggregate contacts with the
nation's government. 7
While both the courts of the District of Columbia and the federal courts of
the District of Columbia Circuit agree on the existence of the government
contacts exception, these two judicial bodies have by no means been consistent
in their application of the exception. 8 The inconsistency surrounding the
exception is primarily caused by the unresolved question of the scope of the
exception.' 9
Specifically, a tension has been generated by a series of
inconsistent judicial decisions concerning whether the exception should be
applied broadly, thereby encompassing all contacts that a non-resident defendant
has with the national government or a governmental agency,' or whether the
exception should be applied narrowly, thereby confining it only to those contacts
that a non-resident defendant has with the national government or its agencies
with respect to that non-resident defendant's First Amendment rights.2'
In certain instances, this tension can lead to results that are conceivably
antithetical to the two original policy concerns that had prompted the formulation
of the government contacts exception. One specific example of this inequity is
the result that is reached when the government contacts exception is applied to
situations regarding tangential disputes involving patents, such as patent
ownership.'

of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
17. See, e.g., Neely, 62 F.2d at 875; Layne, 71 F.2d at 224.
18. See Butler, supra note 10, at 746, 748-53 (stating that the government contacts exception
has generated a great deal of controversy in the courts of the District of Columbia because the courts
do not agree on the boundaries of the exception itselo.
19. Id.
20. See, e.g., Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d
808, 813-14 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (holding that the government contacts exception applies to all
contacts that a non-resident defendant has with the federal government or a governmental
instrumentality). See also infra section III (discussing the government contacts exception, its
controversies, and its present state of affairs).
21. See, e.g., Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1373-74 (D.C. 1978) (holding that "the First
Amendment provides the only principled basis" on which to apply the government contacts
exception), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979).
22. The inequities explored by this note may also arise in disputes involving the ownership of
a copyright or a trademark. In fact, a situation similar to that explored in this note has arisen in the
context of trademarks, specifically, the ownership of a trademark. See, e.g., American Standard,
Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg, Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637 (D.D.C. 1987). In American
Standard, a dispute over the ownership of a trademark arose between a United States company,
American Standard, and a Philippine company, Sanitary Wares, which had entered into a jointventure agreement for the marketing of plumbing products. Id. at 1638. Sanitary Wares filed for
the registration of a trademark in the Philippines which the two companies had planned to use in
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A useful method to explore the intricacies of this injustice is through the
employment of a hypothetical. For example:
Suppose A, a United States citizen, makes an agreement with B, a

conjunction with each other's business. Id.
Once the trademark was registered in the Philippines, Sanitary Wares attempted to register the
same mark in the United States. Id. American Standard opposed the registration of the mark in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) on federal trademark law grounds, claiming that
it was the rightful owner of the mark. Id. However, the PTO dismissed the complaint and
American Sanitary appealed to the District Court. Id.
In addition to the federal trademark opposition claim, American Standard also filed two
common law claims alleging unfair competition and fraud. Id. at 1639. The District Court
dismissed the federal trademark law claim and then examined whether the common law claims of
unfair competition and fraud were properly before the court. Id. The court stated that since the
federal claim was dismissed, both subject matter jurisdiction over the claims and personal jurisdiction
over Sanitary Wares needed to be based on independent grounds. Id. The court found subject
matter to exist under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, and personal jurisdiction to exist under the District of
Columbia long-arm statute. Id. However, the court also noted the existence of the government
contacts exception to the District of Columbia long-arm statute. Id. The court reasoned that since
the only contacts that Sanitary Wares had with the District of Columbia was the filing of the
trademark application in the PTO, and the PTO was a "governmental agency," the government
contacts exception was applicable, thereby defeating jurisdiction. Id. at 1640.
Even though the above case demonstrates that the government contacts exception is applicable
in the case of trademarks, there have, however, been no cases to date that have involved a copyright.
Nevertheless, it would be possible for the exception to be applicable in that case as well. However,
this note will limit its discussion to only patents and contacts with the Patent and Trademark Office.
Although it is beyond the scope of this note to analyze the government contacts exception in
the context of copyrights and trademarks, it should be noted that additional considerations should
be examined before analogizing the proposals in this note to the areas of copyright and trademarks.
First, unlike trademark and copyright law, patent law differs in the scope of the rights granted to
the owner of such intellectual property. For instance, patent law does not mandate that the owner
of the patent manufacture the invention and place the invention on the market. See Special Equip.
Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378 (1945) (holding that the suppression of an invention througha patent
grant is not antithetical to federal patent law, and therefore is not illegal). A patent grant can be
used solely for the suppression of the invention from the marketplace. Id. Thus, foreign owners
of United States patents can receive a patent grant and never need to place the patented invention
on the market, thereby effectively "shielding" them from suit by avoiding additional "contacts."
Furthermore, by law, a trademark owner must have already used his or her mark in commerce
within the United States or must show a bona fide intent to use his or her mark in commerce within
six months from the date of registration. See 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (a)-(d) (1988). Thus, even though
a putative trademark owner may not initially be able to gain personal jurisdiction over the alleged
fraudulent owner, jurisdiction may be had within six months of the registration of that mark when
that alleged owner must necessarily use his or her mark in commerce or face abandonment of that
mark. Id. While this does not solve the government contacts inequities with respect to trademarks
as is demonstrated in American Standard, waiting six months in the case of trademarks for the
alleged owner to make additional "contacts" with the forum is more palatable than having to wait
20 years (the statutory life of the patent) in the case of patents. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994).
Again, while the contentions presented in this note regarding foreign ownership of United States
patents may apply equally to ownership disputes involving United States trademarks and copyrights
owned by a foreign citizen or entity, the above considerations must also be taken into account.
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foreign citizen, to develop an invention.' A and B agree that A will
fund the project and B will be the sole inventor. In return for A's
2
funding, B agrees to assign the ownership of the patent to A. 4
Subsequently, B secretly decides to take the completed work and apply
for his own patent in the United States Patent and Trademark Office
(PTO).' A soon discovers that B has filed this application in the
PTO and A then sues B, claiming ownership of the patent.2
However, A cannot employ federal patent law in order to sue B; patent
ownership disputes involve state contract law. 27 Thus, A must find

23. Note that in this hypothetical, A and B can just as easily be corporate entities. Note also
that the hypothetical is premised upon the fact that A, a United States citizen, solicits the jointventure agreement with B, a foreign citizen, in B's country. This would eliminate an argument that
B had purposefully availed himself or herself of the United States forum in which A resides.
Therefore, it shall be assumed that B's only purposeful contact with any forum in the United States
is with the District of Columbia when B filed the application with the Patent and Trademark Office
(Pro).
24. It is assumed that any such agreement or negotiations were conducted outside the United
States, and the agreement, whether oral or written, contained no formal choice of law provision.
See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462 (1985) (holding that the acquiescence to
a choice of law provision contained within a formal agreement was an important consideration to
effectuate personal jurisdiction). Furthermore, it is also assumed that A and B's relationship is
structured as an investor/investee relationship rather than an employer/employee or an independent
contractor type of relationship and thereby removes the contention of "shop rights." See DONALD
S. CHISUM & MICHAEL A. JACOBS, UNDERSTANDING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY L.Aw § 2G[I], at
2-306-07 (1993).
25. Since 1967, the United States Patent and Trademark Office has been located in Arlington,
Virginia. See LexTex Ltd. v. Skillman, 579 A.2d 244, 245 n.I (D.C. 1990). However, the case
law involving the PTO and the government contacts exception has not explicitly drawn a distinction
upon the fact that the PTO's location is actually outside District Columbia. See American Standard,
Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639 (D.D.C. 1987) (no
distinction); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Maclaren, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1976) (no
distinction). But see Lex Tex, 579 A.2d at 244 (possible implicit distinction). For further discussion
on this fact, and its potential effects on the applicability of the government contacts exception, see
infra note 192.
26. Ideally, A's claim could either be in tort or in contract. Nevertheless, A's claim would still
necessarily be based upon state substantive law, and an applicable state long-arm statute would be
needed in order to effectuate jurisdiction. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary Wares
Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639 (D.D.C. 1987).
27. See 6 DONALD S. CHISUM, PATENTS § 22.02, at 22-3 & § 22.03[4], at 22-49-53 (1990).
Federal patent law provides for the creation of patents and defines what conduct constitutes
infringement. Id. Thus, federal patent law governs what might be termed as the "core" issues
regarding a patent, that is, those issues which involve the validity of the patent itself or the
infringement of the patent itself. Conversely, state substantive law governs the issues of patent
ownership and assignability. Id. Thus, state law governs what might be termed the "tangential"
issues regarding a patent, that is, issues that involve the patent, but do not involve the issues of
validity or infringement of the patent itself which federal law exclusively covers. In other words,
regardless of who owns the patent or to whom that patent is assigned, the patent's validity is not in
question. The falsification of ownership of the patent does not affect the validity of the patent itself,
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a forum in which B is amenable to suit. B's only contact with any
forum in the United States was with the District of Columbia when B
purposely filed the patent application with the PTO..' Therefore, A
must necessarily employ the law of the District of Columbia for
jurisdictional as well as for substantive law purposes. However,
before A can sue B, the District of Columbia must be able to
effectuate personal jurisdiction over B. First, the District of Columbia
long-arm statute must be employed. Secondly, the requisite elements
of the statute and the requirements of procedural due process must be
sufficiently met. Upon an examination of the facts, it is possible to
show that B had "transact[ed] business" in the District within the
meaning of the statute by filing an application with the PTUI and
that due process would not be offended.' However, B s only contact

and thus federal patent law is not triggered. See id. However, it should be noted that the misjoinder
or the nonjoinderof an inventor can constitute grounds for invalidating the patent. See 2 id. § 2.03,
at 2-22. Nevertheless, such is not the case between A and B because, as stated in the hypothetical,
it was B who was the only inventor. See supra text accompanying notes 23-24. See also Ted D.
Lee & Ann Livingston, The Road Less Traveled: State Court Resolution of Patent, Trademark, or
Copyright Disputes, 19 ST. MARY'S L.J. 703, 709-10 (1988) (stating that actions that involve the
ownership of patents do not usually arise under federal patent law; ownership claims are often
essentially contract suits which state substantive law controls); CHISUM & JACOBs, supra note 24,
§ 2G, at 2-305 n.3 ("State contract, tort, and fiduciary laws govern most patent ownership,
transfer[,] and licensing questions.").
28. It is assumed for jurisdictional purposes that the PTO is considered to be located in the
District of Columbia. See supra note 25 and infra note 192.
29. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (Michie 1989) provides:
(a) A District of Columbia court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who
acts directly or by an agent, as to a claim for relief arising from the person's (1) transacting any business in the District of Columbia;
(2) contracting to supply services in the District of Columbia;
(3) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission in the
District of Columbia;
(4) causing tortious injury in the District of Columbia by an act or omission outside
the District of Columbia if he regularly does or solicits business, engages in any other
persistent course of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or
consumed, or services rendered, in the District of Columbia.
Id.
See Mitchell Energy Corp. v.Mary Helen Coal Co., 524 F. Supp. 558 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating that
a single act in the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia by a non-resident defendant, under some
circumstances, may be sufficient to constitute "transacting business," and thereby confer
jurisdiction). See also McDaniel v. Armstrong World Indus., 603 F. Supp. 1337 (D.D.C. 1985)
(stating that the "transacting any business" prong of the District of Columbia long-arm statute is not
restricted to only contract actions, but may also be applied to tort actions).
30. First, the district has a "interest" in preventing the inequitable conduct of B. Second, it
would not be inconvenient for B to be haled into court in the District of Columbia. Third, B's
actions were "purposeful," and as such, B could reasonably anticipate being haled into court.
Finally, the "contacts" of B arose out of the ownership claim. Therefore, notwithstanding the
requirements of the District of Columbia long-arm statute, the District of Columbia assertion of
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with the District of Columbia was with a governmental agency,
namely the PTO. Therefore, the government contacts exception would
be applicable and personal jurisdiction over B would be defeated. 3'
The inequity illustrated in the above hypothetical is that the non-resident,
foreign national, can obtain the benefits and protection of United States' patent
law without incurring the commensurate burden of being amenable to suit
regarding issues that are "tangential," 32 yet of equal importance, to the patent
itself.33 Such inequity is created solely by a broad application of the
government contacts exception, encompassing all non-resident contacts with the
federal government or a federal agency. This Note will analyze the exception,
examine the case law behind the exception, and, in particular, illustrate the
exception in the context of patents. This Note proposes that an exception to the
government contacts exception be made for a non-resident defendant's contacts
with the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) so as to eliminate the inequities
caused by the application of the exception to disputes involving issues tangential
to a United States patent.

personal jurisdiction over B would not offend due process. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U.S. 102, 113-14 (1987) (listing the above requirements which provide the test for
sufficiently meeting the due process requirements); Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,
475-76 (1987) (stating that the non-resident defendant need not have physically "contacted" the
forum in order for personal jurisdiction to be effectuated). See also infra sections II and III (further
discussing the requirements of due process in the context of personal jurisdiction and the District of
Columbia long-arm statute's requirements for authorizing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant).
31. See U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Maclaren, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 498, 501-02 (D.D.C. 1976)
(holding that the filing of a patent application in the PTO cannot confer jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant because the PTO is a governmental agency and the government contacts exception
therefore applies); American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1637, 1639 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that the PTO is a governmental agency and therefore the
government contacts exception applies to preclude jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant whose
only contacts with the District of Columbia were with the PTO).
32. See supra note 27.
33. See, e.g., National Patent Dev. Corp. v. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd., 877 F.2d 1003, 1007
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (en banc). "[I]f one does not own a patent, one certainly lacks the rights of a
patentee . . . ." Id. One commentator illustrates the kind of inequity that arises under the
situation as hypothesized above:
[Tihe unfortunate plaintiff who finds herself the victim of her state's conservative longarm statute is left with two alternatives. She may either prosecute the suit in the courts
of the alien defendant's country of origin where her claim may not be judicially
cognizable, or forgo the assertion of her rights. Few plaintiffs likely possess either the
conviction or the financial resources necessary to pursue the former course. The latter
course of action, or perhaps more appropriately, inaction, satisfies even fewer aggrieved
parties.
Brian B. Frasch, Note, National Contacts As a Basis for In Personam Jurisdictionover Aliens in
FederalQuestion Suits, 70 CAL. L. REV. 686, 692 (1982).
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Specifically, Section II of this Note will briefly trace the evolution of the
Section III will
personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants' theory.'
contacts
"government
of
Columbia's
proceed by discussing the District
the
behind
exception," analyzing its purpose, the present day controversy
cases
found
to
the
exception,
and
exception, cases that were found to be within
5
Section IV will identify the problems with the
be outside the exception.
exception and, in particular, the inequities of applying it to disputes involving
Finally, in Section V, this Note will
tangential issues concerning patents.'
propose an exception to the exception for disputes involving tangential issues
such as ownership disputes regarding patents. Additionally, it will provide valid
an exception, including an examination of the
justifications to accept such
37
underlying policy concerns.
II.

NON-RESIDENT PERSONAL JURISDICTION:

THE "MiNIMUM CONTACTS" TEST
A. The General Canons of the PersonalJurisdiction Calculus
The general canons of the modem day personal jurisdiction calculus
maintain that in order to require a non-resident to defend a suit in a court within
a particular forum, two inquiries must be undertaken: (1) does a state or federal
procedural rule or statute exist that provides for jurisdiction under the alleged
set of facts and circumstances; and (2) are the procedural due process concerns
of the respective state and federal constitutions sufficiently met.' With respect
to the first inquiry, the potentially applicable long-arm statutes provide the
requisite criteria with respect to the first inquiry. Each long-arm statute that is
examined will pose different hurdles in order to generate a positive result to the
first inquiry.39 Ultimately, the applicability of any single long-arm statute will
depend on the compatibility of the facts to the enumerated requirements within
the statute itself, and additionally, any authority interpreting that statute.4
To answer the second inquiry judicial decisions, especially the various
Supreme Court decisions addressing the personal jurisdiction due process

34. See infra notes 38-103 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 104-82 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 183-235 and accompanying text.
37. See infra notes 236-55 and accompanying text.
38. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.18, at 165-66. See also infra note 41.
39. For a general discussion on the criteria and scope of various long-arm statutes, see infra
section II.B. I.
40. See FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 1, § 3.13, at 141-47.
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requirements, must be examined significantly."' The Supreme Court has set
forth several criteria to be used in analyzing the propriety of the assertion of
personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant. These criteria include: (1)
that the non-resident purposefully availed herself of the benefits of the forum so
as to reasonably foresee being haled into court there;42 (2) that the forum
asserting personal jurisdiction has a sufficient interest in the dispute;43 and (3)
that haling the non-resident defendant into court does not cause such an
inconvenience to the non-resident so as to offend the notion of "fair play and
substantial justice."'
If both inquiries are answered in the affirmative,
personal jurisdiction may be constitutionally exercised.45
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington was the first Supreme Court case
to articulate the principles mentioned above. In addressing a non-resident
defendant's due process challenge to the assertion of personal jurisdiction, the
Court stated:
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the territory of the
forum, he have certain minimum contacts with [that forum] such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend "traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice."'"

41. The constitutional right to procedural due process is derived from the Supreme Court's
interpretation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution. The Fifth
Amendment states in relevant part: "No person shall be. . . deprived of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law.. . ." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Fourteenth Amendment, in similar
fashion, states in part: "No State . . . shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property,
without due process of law .... " U.S. CONST. amend XIV, § 1. The primary difference between
the two amendments is their applicability. The Fifth Amendment only applies to the federal
government, and the Fourteenth Amendment applies specifically to the States. See WILLIAM B.
LOCKHART E AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 336 (7th ed. 1991).
42. See, e.g., Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
43. See, e.g., Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987).
44. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (citing Milliken
v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
45. See, e.g., World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980); Asahi,
480 U.S. at 113.
46. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
47. Id. at 316 (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). In InternationalShoe,
a Delaware corporation, with its principle place of business in Missouri, employed a sales agent who
resided and conducted business in Washington state. Id. at 313. Suit was brought by the state tax
commissioner to collect a tax assessment against the non-resident corporation for contributions to
the state's unemployment fund. Id. at 312. Process was served upon the Washington state sales
agent. Id. The non-resident corporation contended that the sales agent was not a true agent of the
company and that because its action did not amount to manifesting its presence within the state of
Washington, the assertion of personal jurisdiction was violative of the Due Process Clause of the
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The Court reasoned that a non-resident defendant's "minimum contacts" with
a forum could constitute a constitutionally acceptable basis for the assertion of
personal jurisdiction.' This reasoning was premised upon the notion that the
privilege of conducting business activity in any given forum necessarily carries
with it the concomitant obligation to respond to suit in that particular forum for
causes of action arising out of that activity.49 However, the Court eschewed
a per se rule for finding personal jurisdiction, stating that the aggregation of
contacts "cannot be simply mechanical or quantitative."' Instead, the inquiry
must concentrate upon "the quality and nature of the activity in relation to the
fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was the purpose of the due
process clause to insure.""1 Therefore, if a non-resident defendant's contacts
with the forum make it reasonable to require that non-resident defendant respond
to suit there, then the concerns of due process are sufficiently met.52
Continuing this line of reasoning, the Supreme Court in McGee v.
3
and Hanson v. Denckla' explained further
InternationalLife Insurance Co. 5'
the significance behind the qualitative nature of the non-resident's contacts.
First, in McGee, the Court held that a non-resident defendant's actions resulted
in a reasonable and foreseeable expectation of being haled into court for any
causes of action arising out of such actions.55 The Court weighed heavily the

Constitution. Id. at 314. The Court noted that the sales agent was under the direct control and
supervision of the company and that the company supplied the sales agent with samples, received
orders from the agent, and shipped merchandise into the state of Washington. Id. Therefore, the
Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction existed. Id. at 315.
48. Id. at 316.
49. Id. at 319.
50. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945).
51. Id.
52. Id.
[T]o the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting activities within
a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws. The exercise of that privilege
may give rise to obligations; and, so far as those obligations arise out of or are
connected with the activities within that state, a procedure which requires the
corporation to respond to a suit brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly
be said to be undue.
Id.

53. 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
54. 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
55. McGee v. International Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). In McGee, a Texas-based
insurance company purchased another life insurance company which, among other things, included
an insurance policy of a California resident. Id. at 221. The insursnce company did not have any
offices in California, nor had it conducted business in the state prior to the events in the suit. Id.
at 222. However, the insurance company did issue a certificate of insurance to the California
insured, and the California insured mailed premium payments from California to the insurer in
Texas. Id. The insured died and the insurer refused to pay the death benefits to the California
beneficiary. Id. In finding personal jurisdiction over the insurer, the Court reasoned that a single
act, here the purposeful availment of the insurance company to do business with the California
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fact that the non-resident defendant benefitted by doing business in that
particular forum.' 6 The Court reasoned that jurisdiction could be effectuated
even though the defendant had but one contact with the forum.57 Therefore,
McGee suggests that due process can be satisfied, and personal jurisdiction
effectuated, even though the non-resident defendant committed only a single act,
so long as that act was purposeful. 5
Conversely, in Hanson, the facts, necessarily warranted an opposite result
from that reached in McGee.59 Unlike McGee, a "purposefully availing" act
by the non-resident defendant was not evidenced in Hanson.' The Court used
the Hanson decision as an opportunity to reemphasize that any determination
regarding the conferral of personal jurisdiction must necessarily take account of
the purposefulness of the act itself.6 Here, because the purposeful act was that
of a third party, not the non-resident defendant, jurisdiction could not be
authorized. 62 The Court reasoned that a unilateral act by a third party cannot
provide a sufficient basis on which to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident
defendant if that defendant did not affirmatively partake in the availing
activity.'
Furthermore, the Court in Hanson rejected an argument by the
plaintiff contending that it would not be at all inconvenient for the non-resident
to defend suit in the forum. 6 The Court reasoned that no matter how minimal
the burden of defending a suit in a foreign tribunal may be, a non-resident
defendant may not be called upon to do so unless that defendant has the requisite
"minimal contacts" with that forum.'
Therefore, mere convenience alone,

insured, was sufficient for purposes of due process. Id.
56. Id. at 222-23.
57. Id. at 223.
58. See id.
59. In Hanson, a Pennsylvania woman executed a trust in Delaware naming as trustee a
Delaware bank. Within the instrument, the settlor retained the power of appointment over the
remainderman to the trust. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 238 (1958). Subsequently, the
settlor moved to Florida and changed her domicile from Pennsylvania to Florida. Id. at 238. While
living in Florida, the senior exercised her power of appointment and appointed a large portion of
the trust to another trust she had previously created. Id. at 239. After the death of the settlor, the
settlor's children brought suit in Florida to contest the effectuation of the power of appointment and
asserted that the amount in question passed to them under the residuary clause. Id. at 240. The
Florida court asserted jurisdiction over the Delaware trustee, and the trustee challenged this assertion
of the Florida's court. Id. In finding that personal jurisdiction did not exist over the Delaware
trustee, the Supreme Court reasoned that the trustee did not have the requisite minimum contacts
with Florida because the trustee's obligation arose in Pennsylvania, and the trustee conducted no
business in Florida. Id. at 254.
60. Id. at 253.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958).
64. Id. at 254.
65. Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss3/6

Schiefelbein: Accepting an Exception to the "Government Contacts Exception" of

1996]

GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION

1035

without purposefulness or consent,' will not suffice.67
The relatively more recent personal jurisdiction cases, including WorldWide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson," Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz,'
and Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court,' while representative of a
restatement of the Supreme Court's past positions, also shed light on various
underemphasized determinants inherent within the minimum contacts test. In
World-Wide Volkswagen, the Court denied the forum's assertion of personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident despite the fact that it was arguably foreseeable
that the non-resident could anticipate being haled into the forum's court.7 The
Court noted that the record evidenced that the purposeful act in this case was not
that of the non-resident defendant, but that of the plaintiffs themselves.'
Hence, jurisdiction was denied.'
In Rudzewicz, the Court stressed the notion of "fair play and substantial
justice" as it interacted with both the "sophistication and experience" of the nonresident defendant and the idea of "fair warning."' In upholding personal

66. Even if it is determined that a non-resident defendant does not have the requisite "minimal
contacts" needed in order to properly hale that non-resident defendant into court within a particular
forum, that non-resident defendant may nonetheless expressly consent to that forum's jurisdiction.
See Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 n.14 (1985). See also FRIEDENTHAL ET AL.,
supra note 1, § 3.5, at 101 (stating that a non-resident defendant is always free to consent to the
jurisdiction and allow a binding, enforceable judgment to be entered against that non-resident
defendant).
67. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 254 (1958).
68. 444 U.S. 286 (1980).
69. 471 U.S. 462 (1985).
70. 480 U.S. 102 (1987).
71. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 295-97 (1980). In World-Wide
Volkswagen, the plaintiffs, a New York couple, were driving their new Audi automobile they had
recently purchased from a New York car dealer. While the couple was driving through Oklahoma,
an accident ensued. The plaintiffs brought a products liability suit in Oklahoma against the New
York car dealer, the national distributor, and the automobile manufacturer. Id. at 288-89.
The Court stated that the test for personal jurisdiction under the due process clause is not just
foreseeability. Id. at 296-99. The test is foreseeability plus reasonableness, that is, whether the
non-resident defendant can reasonably anticipate being haled into court in that forum. Id. at 297.
The Court reasoned that if the test was based solely on foreseeability, the test would sweep too
broadly. Id. at 296-99.
72. Id. at 295. The Court weighed heavily the fact that it was the plaintiffs who drove the car
to Oklahoma, a state in which the New York car dealer and the national distributor had not
conducted any business. Id.
73. Id. at 299.
74. Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472, 484 (1987). In Rudzewicz, two
franchisers of the Burger King Corporation were sued in the state of Florida, the state in which
Burger King was headquartered. The Court weighed heavily the fact that the non-resident defendant
solicited the corporation to do business, and that the defendant signed a franchise agreement with
a choice of law provision stating that Florida law would control. Id. at 479-80. The Court also
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jurisdiction, the Court noted that a non-resident defendant's experience and
sophistication can be a factor in discerning the reasonableness of a jurisdictional
exercise.75 Moreover, the Court stated that a non-resident defendant need not
physically enter the forum in order to be amenable to suit.76
Finally in Asahi, the Supreme Court denied personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant corporation based primarily on the fact that both the
plaintiff and the defendant were foreign corporations. 7
The Court also
reasoned that other judicial fora were just as, if not more, accessible to the
parties in other locations.7' Thus, the Court recognized that factors such as the
forum's interest in the dispute and the non-resident's convenience in regard to
defending the dispute in that forum play an equally important role in the
jurisdictional calculus as the purposefulness of the act. 9
While the Supreme Court is the final arbiter in the personal jurisdiction
calculus, the Court has set forth only the outer parameters of the constitutionally
prescribed calculus.' On the other hand, it is the individual long-arm statutes
which are dispositive of the issue of the specific amount of power that can be
utilized by the forum through the long-arm statute.8' Whether a forum decides

noted the intricacies of the negotiations surrounding the franchise agreement and the absence of
unconscionable circumstances. Id. at 479-80.
75. Id. at 484.
76. Id. at 476.
Although territorial presence frequently will enhance a potential defendant's affiliation
with a State and reinforce the reasonable foreseeability of suit there, it is an inescapable
fact of modem commercial life that a substantial amount of business is transacted solely
by mail and wire communications across state lines, thus obviating the need for physical
presence within a State in which business is conducted. So long as a commercial actor's
efforts are "purposefully directed" toward residents of another State, [the Court] has
consistently rejected the notion that an absence of physical contacts can defeat personal
jurisdiction there.
Id. See also Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774-75 (1984) (holding that personal
jurisdiction can be effectuated even though the non-resident defendant's only contact was the
distribution of magazines to the residents of the state in which the suit was filed).
77. Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102, 114 (1987). Asahi was a
products liability suit brought by a California resident against a foreign motorcycle manufacturer,
a foreign motorcycle tire manufacturer, and a foreign tire components manufacturer. Once the
plaintiff's original suit was settled, the latter two foreign manufacturers instituted a suit challenging
each other's contribution to the damages. Id. at 105-06.
78. Id. at 114-15.
79. Id. at 114, 116.
80. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.11, at 138 (stating that the Supreme Court's
personal jurisdiction cases only suggest how far a forum may assert personal jurisdiction over a nonresident; the cases do not provide authority on self-imposed limitations); JAMES ET AL., supra note
1, § 2.6, at 63 (stating that a state may enact a long-arm statute to the extent that it is consistent with
the Constitution).
81. FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 1, § 3.12, at 138-41.
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to equip its long-arm statute with power equal to or less than the constitutionally
prescribed limits depends upon the wording of the statute and any case law
interpreting that statute.' It is through the interaction of the case law and the
various long-arm statutes that personal jurisdiction is ultimately effectuated.'
B. Interpolation - Case Law and Long-Arm Statutes
1. Generally
Before a plaintiff can successfully employ a long-arm statute's jurisdictional
power, that plaintiff must generally navigate three obstacles."' First, the
language of the statute must provide for jurisdiction under the circumstances
surrounding the asserted cause of action." Second, any authority interpreting
the application of the particular statute must be satisfied." Third, the assertion
of jurisdiction through the statute must be in accord with the applicable
constitutional due process standards.' If these obstacles are not successfully
navigated, the statute will be unable to authorize personal jurisdiction.'
As products of the Supreme Court's decisions, all long-arm statutes are
enacted for the sole purpose of prescribing specific types of conduct or events
that would render a non-resident amenable to suit." A variety of activities or
events, if occurring within the forum, trigger the authority of a long-arm statute,
including: the transaction of any business, the commission of a legally
actionable event such as a tort, the ownership of property, and entering into a
contract.' Furthermore, there may also be some instances where even though
the activity occurs outside the forum, such activity nevertheless results in
actionable consequences within the forum, thus providing an additional basis on
which to assert jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. 9

82. Id. § 3.12, at 141. See aLso CRUMPET AL., supra note 1, at 82.
[T]he extent of a state's jurisdiction is actually subject to two different kinds of
restrictions. First, it must comply with due process. The basic test for this requirement
is the minimum contacts test. Secondly, it must comply with state law. Each state has
one or more "long arm" statutes. The reach of long arm jurisdiction depends upon the
traditions and values. . . in its long-arm statute.

Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

FRIEDENTHAL EIT AL., supra note 1, § 3.12, at 141.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. § 3.12, at 139.
Id.
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While the various long-arm statutes generally cover the same activities and
events, the statutes can differ in the amount of detail that they contain.' For
instance, some statutes prescribe specific actions or events that trigger the
assertion of jurisdiction, as well as those acts which fall outside the specificities
enumerated that do not trigger the statute. 93 Conversely, other long-arm
statutes employ a more generalized language, which require that a court explore
the various decisions made in the past under the long-arm statute and compare
those decisions to the present set of circumstances in order to determine if
jurisdiction can be authorized.'
In either case, however, the ultimate result
of authorizing personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant will

92. Id. § 3.13, at 141-47.
93. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 735, § 512-209 (Smith-Hurd 1993) which provides:
(a) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this State, who in person or
through an agent does any of the acts hereinafter enumerated, thereby submits such
person, and, if an individual, his or her personal representative, to the jurisdiction of

the courts of this State as to any cause of action arising from the doing of any such acts:
(1) The transaction of any business within this State;
(2) The commission of a tortious act within this State;
(3) The ownership, use, or possession of any real estate situated in this State;
(4) Contracting to insure any person, property or risk located within this State
at the time of contracting;
(5) With respect to actions of dissolution of marriage, declaration of invalidity
of marriage and legal separation, the maintenance in this State of a matrimonial
domicile at the time this cause of action arose or the commission in this State of
any act giving rise to the cause of action;
(6) With respect to causes of action brought under the Illinois Parentage Act of
1984, as now or hereinafter amended, the performance of an act of sexual
intercourse within this state during the possible period of conception;
(7) The making or performance of any contract or promise substantially
connected with this State;
(8) The performance of sexual intercourse within this State which is claimed to
have resulted in the conception of a child who resides in this State;
(9) The failure to support a child, spouse or former spouse who has continued
to reside in this State since the person either formerly resided with them in this
State or directed them to reside in this State;
(10) The acquisition of ownership, possession or control of any asset or thing
of value present within this State when ownership, possession or control was
acquired;
(11) The breach of any fiduciary duty within this State;
(12) The performance of duties as a director or officer of a corporation
organized under the laws of this State or having its principal place of business
within this State;
(13) The ownership of an interest in any trust administered within this State; or
(14) The exercise of powers granted under the authority of this State as a
fiduciary.
94. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973), which provides:
"A court in this state may exercise jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution
of this state or of the United States."
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nevertheless be dependent upon the satisfaction of the long-arm statute's
requirements and the requirements of due process imposed constitutionally?
2. The District of Columbia Long-Arm Statute
The District of Columbia long-arm statute is an example of a long-arm
statute that permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident to
the full extent allowed by the Due Process Clause of the Constitution?7 The
District of Columbia long-arm statute originated as part of the District of
Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of 19 7 0 ." Its purpose
was to provide the District of Columbia with a long-arm statute that was equal
in scope to the long-arm statutes of the District's neighboring states,
Maryland" and Virginia," as well as being coextensive with the

95. FRIEDENTHALEr AL., supra note 1, § 3.12, at 141.
96. D.C. CODE ANN. § 13-423(a) (Michie 1989). See supra note 29 for the text of the statute.
97. See, e.g., First Chicago Int'l v. United Exch. Co., 836 F.2d 1375, 1377 (D.C. Cir. 1988)
(stating that the District of Columbia long-arm statute is co-extensive with the due process clause);
Mitchell Energy Corp. v. Mary Helen Coal Co., 524 F. Supp. 558, 558 (D.D.C. 1981) (stating that
the District of Columbia long-arm statute permits jurisdiction to the fullest extent permissible under
the due process clause); Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187, 1190 (D.C. 1983) (stating that the
District of Columbia long-arm statute contemplates the exercise of personal jurisdiction to the fullest
extent permissible under the due process clause); Smith v. Jenkins, 452 A.2d 333, 337 (D.C. 1982)
(holding that the District of Columbia long-arm statute is coextensive with due process); Mouzavires
v. Baxter, 434 A.2d 988, 988 (D.C. 1981) (holding the District of Columbia long-arm statute's
reach is coextensive with the due process clause), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1006 (1982); Rose v.
Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1369 (D.C. 1978) (stating that the District of Columbia long-arm statute's
reach is limited only by due process considerations), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979);
Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 808 (D.C.
1976) (en banc) (stating that the reach of District of Columbia long-arm statute is only tempered by
the decisions of the Supreme Court and the government contacts exception that the courts of the
District of Columbia have enacted).
It should also be noted that in the District of Columbia, the Fourteenth Amendment does not
apply because the District of Columbia is not a state. See Hughes v. A.H. Robins Co., 490 A.2d
1140, 1144 n.3 (D.C. 1985). However, the Fifth Amendment is applicable, and it contains a due
process clause which reaches at least as far as its Fourteenth Amendment counterpart. See Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954). Nevertheless, for purposes of analyzing the constitutionality of
a District of Columbia court's exercise of personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant, the
same principles of due process apply. See Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1144 n.3.
98. Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473 (1970).
99. See Groom v. Margulies, 265 A.2d 249, 253 (Md. 1970) (holding that the long-arm statute
of Maryland permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendants to the fullest
extent of constitutionally prescribed limits).
100. See Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern Chair Co., 180 S.E.2d 664, 667 (Va. 1971) (holding that
the long-arm statute of Virginia permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over non-resident
defendants to the fullest extent of constitutionally prescribed limits).
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The District of
jurisdictional limitations imposed by the Constitution.'
Columbia's purpose in duplicating the Maryland and Virginia long-arm statutes
was to create one uniform standard of jurisdiction in light of the close proximity
of the three areas geographically, and the large amount of interaction among
these three areas' populations. "0e
Although the District of Columbia long-arm statute, like its counterparts in
Maryland and Virginia, permits the exercise of jurisdiction within the
constitutionally prescribed limits, the statute is, unlike its counterparts, harnessed
by a self-imposed judicial limitation. This judicial limitation is known as the
government contacts exception. Consequently, while appearing facially capable
of extending personal jurisdiction to the constitutionally prescribed limits, the
District of Columbia long-arm statute can be, in certain situations, anything but
extensive. 0 3
Ill. THE DisTRICT OF

COLUMBIA GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION

A. Historical Overview and Policy Perspectives
The promulgation of the government contacts exception in the District of
Columbia occurred in a series of cases during the 1930s and 1940s involving
non-resident, news-gathering organization defendants. The first case to proffer
the exception was Neely v. PhiladelphiaInquirer Co. "o4 In Neely, the court
held that a non-resident newspaper was not amenable to suit in the District
because the only contact that the newspaper had with the District of Columbia
was obtaining newsworthy information about the government's activities and
The court reasoned that if the mere monitoring of the national
occurrences."0

101. See, e.g., Rose, 394 A.2d at 1369 (stating that the District of Columbia long-arm statute
was modeled after the long-arm statutes of Maryland and Virginia which are tempered only by the
due process clause), reh "g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979); EnvironmentalResearch, 355 A.2d
at 810 (stating that Congress intended to provide the District of Columbia with a long-arm statute
equivalent in scope to those of Maryland and Virginia); Margoles v. Johns, 483 F.2d 1212, 1215-16
(D.C. Cir. 1973) (same). See also S. Rep. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1969); H.R. Rep.
No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 61 (1970) (same).
102. Margoles, 483 F.2d at 1215-16. See also Butler, supra note 10, at 747 (stating that the
enactment of the District of Columbia long-arm statute to the extent equal to that of Maryland's and
Virginia's was desirable in light of the geography of the three areas and the high volume of traveling
to each area by the citizens of all three areas).
103. See, e.g., infra notes 104-41 and accompanying text.
104. 62 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1932). In Neely, a non-resident newspaper corporation maintained
an office and hired a news correspondent to track the activities of the federal government. Id. at
874. The Plaintiff sued the defendant newspaper for an article printed in the paper that allegedly
defamed the plaintiff. Id. at 874-75.
105. Id. at 875.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss3/6

Schiefelbein: Accepting an Exception to the "Government Contacts Exception" of

1996]

GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION

1041

government's activities in the District of Columbia by a non-resident news
organization rendered that organization amenable to suit in the District, then the
interests of the public would be negatively impacted because such an application
would in effect chill the press and transform the District of Columbia into a
national judicial forum. "36

Two years later, the Federal District Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia faced an identical fact pattern to that of Neely in Layne v. Tribune
Co.'0 7 As in the Neely case, personal jurisdiction over the non-resident
defendant in Layne was denied based upon the unique position of the District of
Columbia as the seat of the national government, the corresponding right of the
press to have unfettered access to the forum for news-gathering activities
involving the government and its agencies, and the concern of the District of
Columbia developing into a national judicial forum." However, in addition
to concurring with the Neely decision, the Layne court added a caveat to the
exception. The court noted that while the mere collection of news material in
the District of Columbia for use in subsequent publication elsewhere did not
subject the non-resident defendant to suit, the collection of that news material
in the District of Columbia and its subsequent sale in the District could provide
the grounds on which jurisdiction could be asserted." ° The court reasoned
that the non-resident news-gathering organization would be pursuing an activity
other than mere news-gathering; the organization would be pursuing income
generating activity, and thus would be amenable to suit."' Therefore, to the

106. Id. The court explained:
As the seat of national government, Washington is the source of much news of national
importance, which makes it desirable in the public interest that many newspapers should
If the employment of a Washington
maintain vigilant correspondents here.
correspondent, the announcement of his address, and the payment of his office rent,
subjects a nonresident newspaper corporation to legal process in Washington for matter
appearing in its paper at home, it would bring in nearly every important newspaper in
the nation, and many foreign publishing corporations ....
Id.
107. 71 F.2d 223 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 293 U.S. 572 (1934).
108. Layne, 71 F.2d at 223-34. InLayne, the non-resident defendant, the Tribune Company,
maintained a news-gathering agent and leased a telegraph wire to transmit the gathered news from
the District of Columbia. Id. at 223. The plaintiff brought suit for an alleged libelous article printed
by the Tribune Company. Id. In relying on all points in its prior decision in Neely, the court
quashed service. Id. at 224.
109. Id. at 224.
110. Id.
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extent that a non-resident defendant's contacts in the District of Columbia with
the government constitute something other than mere information gathering,
those contacts should fall outside the scope of the exception and personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant should be authorized.''
It was not until 1945, in Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co.,112
that the government contacts exception was again raised. Unlike the Neely and
Layne decisions, Mueller Brass was the first decision to have applied the
exception to a non-resident defendant other than a news-gathering organization." 3 Even despite this seemingly significant factual distinction from the
Neely and Layne cases, the Mueller Brass court nevertheless held that the
exception was applicable by reasoning that it was immaterial whether the nonresident defendant was involved in news service or otherwise; the dispositive
factor was that the non-resident defendant was merely gathering information
about the nation's government."" Therefore, the non-resident defendant's
contacts were excepted from the District's personal jurisdiction calculus. 5

111. Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1934). Q. Ricketts v. Sun Printing
& Publ. Ass'n, 27 App. D.C. 222 (1906) (holding that a non-resident newspaper was amenable to
suit in the District of Columbia because the news gathered was sold to other newspapers who in turn
sold those papers in Washington, thus deriving income from the citizens District of Columbia). As
.will later be developed in section V of this note, this is the type of reasoning that this note's
"exception to the exception" is premised upon. The notion of quid pro quo coupled with a
defendant's economic interest essentially leads back to the Supreme Court's 'purposeful availment'
element. See supra section H. A. It is through this reasoning that an "exception to the exception"
should be implemented for suits involving tangential issues concerning patents. See infra section V.
112. 152 F.2d 142 (D.C. Cir. 1945).
113. Id. at 145. In Mueller Brass, a non-resident defendant corporation, a maker of military
supplies, maintained a representative in a District of Columbia office to monitor the government's
military needs. Id. at 143. The representative's sole duty was to monitor, and the representative
was not allowed to enter into any binding contracts with the government. Id. In analogizing the
non-resident defendant's "monitoring" activities to that of newspapers, the court quashed service.
Id. at 143-44.
114. Id. at 143. The court relied heavily on the fact that the representative did not have any
power to bind any business obligations, and that the representative's sole purpose was to promote
the company, gather information about the government's needs, and to report that information back
to corporate headquarters. Id. at 144. The fact that the court was willing to apply the exception
to an organization other than the press is in accordande with modern day first amendment
jurisprudence, and therefore was not such an egregious extension of the exception as the plaintiff
in Mueller Brass argued. See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (stating that
first amendment jurisprudence has never provided for specialized treatment of the press, and
similarly, the First Amendment applies to all citizens, not just the press).
115. Mueller Brass, 152 F.2d at 145.
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In comparing the Neely, Layne, and Mueller Brass decisions,'" it is
noticeable that throughout these decisions, two underlying policy concerns
behind the government contacts exception were articulated. The first policy
concern was the constitutionally guaranteed right of freedom of access to the
nation's government premised upon the First Amendment." 7 The second

116. Other "government contacts exception" decisions that chronologically followed the Neely,
Layne, and Mueller Brass decisions, but were decided before the two controversial decisions
discussed infra include: Siam Craft Paper Co. v. Parsons & Whittmore, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 810,
812 (D.D.C. 1975) (denying personal jurisdiction over non-resident defendant whose only contacts
with the jurisdiction involved "uniquely governmental activities'); Fandel v. Arabian Am. Oil Co.,
345 F.2d 87, 88-89 (D.C. Cir. 1965) (holding that the "government contacts exception" was
applicable to a Middle East oil company which maintained a diplomatic relationship with the State
Department and other agencies reasoning that "Washington presents many business organizations
with special needs for a continuous and ponderable physical presence there, which needs are not
those customarily associated with strictly commercial operations ... and ... Congress was not to
make that presence in every case a base for the assertion of personal jurisdiction"); Traher v. De
Havilland Aircraft of Canada, Ltd., 294 F.2d 229, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (holding that the
"government contacts exception" applied to a non-resident Canadian aircraft manufacturer who had
one employee in the District of Columbia for the sole purpose of serving as a "liaison or contact
man with the United States Government" and armed forces), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 954 (1962).
117. See, e.g., Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1932), cert.
denied, 293 U.S. 572 (1934); Layne v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1934); Mueller
Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142, 143 (D.C. Cir. 1945). The First Amendment
of the United States Constitution provides in relevant part that: "Congress shall make no law . .
• abridging the . . . right of the people peaceably. . . to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The government contacts exception is a corollary of the
First Amendment's right to petition the government without interference or conditions placed upon
that right by government. See, e.g., Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978), reh 'g denied, 398
A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979). As the District of Columbia's long-arm statute reaches all contacts of nonresidents with the District of Columbia to the fullest extent allowed by the Constitution, the statute
would, in its most basic terms, include those contacts with the government by non-residents. See,
e.g., Hummel v. Koehler, 458 A.2d 1187 (D.C. 1983). The courts felt that such a far reaching
application of the long-arm statute would in effect inhibit the citizenry's right to access the national
government, and therefore, promulgated the government contacts exception. See, e.g., Neely, 62
F.2d at 875; Layne, 71 F.2d at 224; Mueller Brass, 152 F.2d at 143.
However, it should be noted that the District of Columbia courts' reliance on the First
Amendment as a basis for the government contacts exception may be questionable. In 1984, the
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment could not be interjected as an additional consideration
in the personal jurisdiction calculus. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790 (1984). The Court
reasoned that the First Amendment would needlessly infuse further considerations, thereby
complicating an already delicate balancing process. Id. "To reintroduce [First Amendment]
concerns at the jurisdictional stage would be a form of double counting." Id. Therefore, if Calder
stands for the proposition that the First Amendment cannot be an additional basis on which to deny
jurisdiction, then the District of Columbia's reliance on the First Amendment as a basis for the
existence of the government contacts exception is flawed.
To date, only one case in the District of Columbia has addressed this potential conflict. See
Moncrief v. Lexington Herald-Leader Co., 807 F.2d 217, 221-25 (D.C. Cir. 1986). However, the
Moncriefcourt avoided a direct engagement of the issue of whether Calderoverrules the government
contacts exception because the court distinguished Calder on the basis that Neely, the original
decision articulating the government contacts exception, was not prompted at all by the First
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policy concern, prudentially derived, was the fear of transforming the District
of Columbia into a national judicial forum."' Because the choice to access
the nation's government in the District of Columbia is a guaranteed, necessary,
and non-discretionary right, the courts of the District of Columbia reasoned that
the two policy concerns outweighed any interest that the District of Columbia
might have in obligating a non-resident defendant to respond to suit in the
District's courts if personal jurisdiction could only be based upon the nonresident defendant's contacts with the national government or its agencies." 9
While each of these concerns is representative of equally valid reasons for the
existence of the government contacts exception, the legitimacy of these concerns
may become questionable when the exception is applied past the original
functional sphere of those concerns."O

Amendment. Id. at 223. Rather, the court stated that the Neely decision stood for a categorical
exception to the District of Columbia long-arm statute for non-resident newspapers. Id. While the
court never mentioned the "government contacts exception" by name, it did clearly state that Neely
and the cases following that decision were not based upon the First Amendment because "the court
in Neely did not mention [it]." Id. However, this conclusion is inconsistent and in direct conflict
with the leading government contacts exception cases in the District of Columbia. See, e.g., Rose,
394 A.2d at 1373-74 (stating that the government contacts exception arose out of a series of nonresident newspaper cases, namely.Neely and Layne, which "had emerged with a First Amendment
as well as [a] due process underpinning"); Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene
Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808, 813 n. I1 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (stating that the government contacts
exception arose from a series of cases that were concerned with the impermissible burden on the
First Amendment and that the exception does not find itself in the wording of the long-arm statute,
but rather is principled upon the fact that the District of Columbia is the seat of the nation's
government and the citizenry has the right of unfettered access to the government).
Moreover, the Rose decision itself clearly states that the government contacts exception to the
District of Columbia long-arm statute is principled upon the First Amendment. See Rose, 394 A.2d
at 1374. Yet Rose has not been overruled. Furthermore, the Calder decision which was delivered
in 1984, has never been mentioned in any of the government contacts exception cases that have been
decided after 1984 to the present date.
Nevertheless, in light of the Calder decision and the apparent inconsistencies in the Moncrief
court's reasoning, it would appear that the government contacts exception to the District of Columbia
long-arm statute can no longer continue to exist because it is principally based upon the First
Amendment. However, no court in the District of Columbia has explicitly or implicitly abrogated
the government contacts exception, and those courts continue to apply the exception despite the
existence of the Calder decision. The reasoning behind this continuation is unclear. Perhaps one
reason that the District of Columbia continues to apply the government contacts exception is because
after the Calder decision was rendered, the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari to a
government contacts exception case. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 (D.C.
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). The denial of certiorari by the Supreme Court may
have been interpreted by the District of Columbia courts as a tacit acceptance of the government
contacts exception.
118. See, e.g., Neely, 62 F.2d at 875; Layne, 71 F.2d at 224; Mueller Brass, 152 F.2d at 143.
119. See, e.g., Neely, 62 F.2d at 875; Layne, 71 F.2d at 224; Mueller Brass, 152 F.2d at 143.
120. See Butler, supra note 10, at 757-59.
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B. Present Day Controversy: How Farto Except?
The present controversy surrounding the government contacts exception is
At the forefront of the
primarily over the ill-defined scope of the exception.'
controversy are two decisions, Environmental Research International, Inc. v.
In
Lockwood Greene Engineers, Inc. ," and Rose v. Silver." 3
Environmental Research, the government contacts exception was given its most
liberal reading. "4 The District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the
exception applies in all cases in which a "nonresident[']s. . . sole contact with
the District [of Columbia] consists of dealing with [the federal government or]
The court reasoned that such a liberal
a federal instrumentality""
interpretation was required in order to meaningfully preserve the two policy
considerations set forth in the Mueller Brass case and its progeny."

121. See id. at 746, 757-59.
122. 355 A.2d 808 (D.C. 1976) (en banc).
123. 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979).
124. See Butler, supra note 10, at 749.
125. EnvironmentalResearch, 355 A.2d at 813.
126. Id. at 813. The court supported this contention by focusing on each one of the policy
considerations. See id. The court reasoned:
The rationale for the "government contacts" exception to the District of Columbia's
long-arm statute does not hinge upon the wording of the statute. Rather, it finds its
source in the unique character of the District as the seat of national government and the
correlative need for unfettered access to federal departments and agencies for the entire
national citizenry. To permit our local courts to assert personal jurisdiction over nonresidents whose sole contact is with a federal instrumentality not only would pose a
threat to free public participation in government, but also would threaten to convert the
District of Columbia into a national judicial forum.
Id. The Environmental Research court stated that the Mueller Brass decision was the first case to
articulate the government contacts exception. See id. While the Mueller Brass decision was the first
case to apply the exception to a non-news-gathering entity, it was not the first case to articulate the
government contacts exception. See Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142,
142 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1945) (noting that the Neely and the Layne decisions were the first cases to
articulate the government contacts exception); see also Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1373 (D.C.
1978) (stating that the government contacts exception emerged from the non-resident newspaper
cases of Neely and Layne), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979); Butler, supra note 10, at 747
(stating that the exception originated from a series of non-resident newspaper organization cases,
namely Neely and Layne).
While the EnvironmentalResearch court did acknowledgethe existence of the Layne and Neely
decisions, it relegated the cases to a general footnote. See EnvironmentalResearch, 355 A.2d at 813
n.9. Arguably, the fact that the Environmental Research court relied so heavily on the Mueller
Brass decision might explain why the Environmental Research court felt so unrestrained when it
broadened the exception to the extent that it did. Since the Mueller Brass decision did not involve
a newspaper and did not explicitly mention the First Amendment, the EnvironmentalResearch court,
by relying on the Mueller Brass decision, may have seen its expansion of the government contacts
exception so as to include all contacts with the federal government of its agencies as a logical and
consistent evolution of precedent.
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Under the EnvironmentalResearch court's interpretation of the exception,
any purposeful contact with the government or a governmental agency by a nonresident defendant in the District of Columbia would be exempted from the
District of Columbia long-arm statute's jurisdictional calculus.' 27 Moreover,
the Environmental Research court's interpretation of the government contacts
exception would bar personal jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant whose
only contacts with the District of Columbia were with the national government
or its agencies even if personal jurisdiction was premised upon the activities of
the non-resident that gave rise to the claim itself."
As the dissent in
Environmental Research asserted, as have some commentators, such an
interpretation is directly in conflict with the basic notion of specific
jurisdiction"s behind the Supreme Court's "minimum contacts" test.'3

127. See Environmental Research Int'l, Inc. v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808,
813 (D.C. 1976).
128. Id. at 813-14. See Butler, supra note 10, at 749-50.
129. Personal jurisdiction over a non-resident has been classified into two categories, "specific"
and "general." Specific jurisdiction is based upon a "specific" act by the non-resident defendant
that gives rise to the very claim that is being litigated. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note
§
3.10, at 123-25. To effectuate personal jurisdiction, a plaintiff need only show that the cause of
action arose out of the very activity that the non-resident defendant conducted in the forum. Id.
See, e.g., McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222-23 (1957) (holding that the
forum had personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant based upon its sole contact with the
forum which gave rise to the plaintiff's cause of action). See also supra text accompanying notes
55-58 (explaining the significance of the McGee decision).
Conversely, general jurisdiction is defined as personal jurisdiction based upon the non-resident
defendant's "continual and systematic activity" within the forum. See FPIEDENtwHALLrE AL., supra
note 1, § 3.10, at 123-25. To effectuate personal jurisdiction under the "general" jurisdiction
theory, a plaintiff need not show that activity that gave rise to the claim itself. Id. However, the
plaintiff must show that the non-resident defendant has been systematically and continually
conducting activity so as to obligate itself to respond to suits that do not necessarily give rise to the
particular claim. Id. See, e.g., Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408,
416-18 (1984) (denying personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant on the grounds that the
cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's contacts, and the defendant did not systematically
or continually conduct activity in the forum so as to give rise to obligations unrelated to its liability
generating acts). See generally B. Glenn George, In Search of GeneralJurisdiction, 64 TUL. L.
REv. 1097 (1990) (explaining the nuances of general jurisdiction).
The primary difference between the two categories is the amount of evidence that a plaintiff
must present in order to sustain personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant. See
FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., § 3.10, at 123-25. Under specific jurisdiction, a single purposeful act by the
non-resident in the forum may be a sufficient basis on which to predicate personal jurisdiction, so
long as that single purposeful act gave rise to the cause of action. See id. In many instances the
burden of proving that such acts gave rise to the cause of action will be easily overcome. See id.
Conversely, under general jurisdiction, a single purposeful act will not suffice to support personal
jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant if the cause of action is unrelated to that single
purposeful act. See id; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18. A plaintiff must show a continuous and
systematic grouping of acts. See Helicapteros, 466 U.S. at 416-18.

I
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Thus, under the EnvironmentalResearch court's reasoning, if a plaintiff's cause
of action arises from the non-resident defendant's contacts with the government,
the plaintiff will not be able to sue the non-resident in the District of Columbia,
the situs of the actionable activity, because of the government contacts
exception. I
If the Environmental Research decision is representative of a liberal
interpretation of the scope of the government contacts exception, then it is Rose
v. Silver 13 2 which is illustrative of a more conservative view. 3 3 It was only
two years after the Environmental Research decision was rendered, that the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia made the determination to relegate
the Environmental Research court's extension of the exception to a narrower
scope. First, the Rose court distinguished the Environmental Research decision
on the grounds that the legal relationship existing between the disputing parties
in each case was different, thereby requiring different results."
The Rose
court stated that the Environmental Research court's discussion of the
government contacts exception was but a minor part of the case and that the
decision regarding the non-resident's contacts was really based on due process
and nothing more. 35 The Rose court then proceeded by stating that its ruling
on the government contacts exception "will require virtually a fresh inquiry,"
and concluded that "after reviewing the development of the government contacts
principle, . . . the First Amendment provides the only principled basis [on
which to invoke the exception] " '~

130. Environmental Research, 355 A.2d at 818 (Fickling, J., dissenting); See Butler, supra
note 10, at 749-50 (stating that the EnvironmentalResearch court's interpretation of the government
contacts exception is in direct conflict with the Supreme Court's fundamental premise of "minimum
contacts" in InternationalShoe).
131. See Environmental Research, 355 A.2d at 813-14. See also American Standard, Inc. v.
Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639-40 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that
personal jurisdiction did not exist even though the non-resident defendant's activity with the United
States Patent and Trademark Office gave rise to the plaintiff's claim because the non-resident
defendant's only contact with the District of Columbia was with the PTO, a governmental agency,
and therefore the government contacts exception applied).
132. 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979).
133. See Butler, supra note 10, at 750-51.
134. Rose, 394 A.2d at 1370. The court distinguished EnvironmentalResearch on the grounds
of agency law. See id.
135. Id. at 1373.
136. Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1374 (D.C. 1978). By limiting the government contacts
exception to only those contacts that implicate the First Amendment, the court narrowed the
applicability of the government contacts exception to those cases which presumably fall under the
rubric of the First Amendment's petition clause. See id.
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Unfortunately, the result of the Rose decision has done nothing more than
13 7
guarantee a controversy over the applicable scope of the exception.
Theoretically, Rose, which was a panel decision, cannot overrule the
Environmental Research decision because the Environmental Research decision
was delivered en banc. "
Therefore, it appears that both cases exist
concurrently as good law today. Consequently, this situation has allowed
subsequent courts in the District of Columbia to summarily choose between the
Rose decision and the Environmental Research decision, as to which is to be
controlling in a given case. Nevertheless, it has been argued that the Rose
decision commited the government contacts exception to a very narrow
39
inquiry. 1
In summary, the status of the government contacts exception in the District
of Columbia following Environmental Research and Rose is clear in only one
respect:
inconsistent judicial application." 4
Since the decisions in
Environmental Research and Rose, over two dozen cases, both in the federal
courts for the District of Columbia Circuit and the District of Columbia's courts,
have been decided in which the government contacts exception was implicated
to some degree.14

137. See, e.g., Nichols v. G.D. Searle &:Co., 783 F. Supp. 233, 242 (D. Md. 1992) (stating
that the Rose decision only created confusion as to what the law is regarding the government contacts
exception in the District of Columbia).
138. Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368 (D.C. 1978), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787, 787 (D.C.
1979) (stating that a panel decision is prohibited from issuing an opinion which conflicts materially
with a prior decision that was delivered en banc, and that any abrogation of an en banc decision can
only be done by the court sitting en banc) (citing M.A.P. v. Ryan, 285 A.2d 310 (D.C. 1971)).
139. See Butler, supra note 10, at 750 (stating that the Rose decision greatly narrowed the
EnvironmentalResearch decision even though it did not overrule it).
140. See id. at 754-57 (mapping out the judicial inconsistency involving the "government
contacts exception"). See also Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 783 F. Supp. 233, 242 (D. Md.
1992) (stating that the District of Columbia's government contacts exception is in a state of
confusion, and that decisions subsequent to the Rose decision have done nothing to make the law of
the District of Columbia any clearer on this matter).
141. See, e.g., Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984); Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhl Wine Distribs. Pty.
Ltd., 647 F.2d 200 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Steinberg v. International Criminal Police Org., 672 F.2d 927
(D.C. Cir. 1981); Bechtel & Cole v. Graceland Broadcasting Inc., 18 F.3d 953 (D.C. Cir. 1994);
Hayhurst v. Calabrese, 988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993); Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F.
Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1992); Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 786 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1992); Armco
Steel Co. v. CSX Corp., 790 F. Supp. 311 (D.D.C. 1991); Johns v. Rozet, 770 F. Supp. 11
(D.D.C. 1991); Rochon v. F.B.I., 691 F. Supp. 1548 (D.D.C. 1988); Coalition on Sensible
Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1986); Brown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp.
1106 (D.D.C. 1987); United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., No. 86-333, 1987 WL 10501
(D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1987); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Federal Land Bank of Tex., Nos. 870085, 87-0601, 1987 WL 10518 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1987); American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary
Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637 (D.D.C. 1987); Chase v. Pan-Pacific Broadcasting,
Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1985); National Coal Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C.
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C. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals After Environmental Research
and Rose: Wat's In, What's Out?
In the time period subsequent to the Environmental Research and Rose
decisions, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has issued only three
decisions that have involved the government contacts exception, including:
Hughes v. A.H. Robins Co. ,42 Lex Tex Ltd. v. Skillman, 43 and Beachboard
v. Trustees of Columbia University.'" Notably, only two of the three
decisions have expressly or tacitly remained consistent with the policy of
applying the government contacts exception as narrowly as did the court in
Rose. For example, in Hughes, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
departed from the Rose decision and held that a non-resident defendant's
contacts, the commercial monitoring of congressional legislation and the
gathering of that information, was clearly within the government contacts
exception. 145
However, in Lex Tex, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that
a non-resident attorney, who had allegedly misrepresented his client before the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) in the District of
Columbia," was amenable to suit based upon that sole contact. 147 Despite

1984); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182 (D.D.C. 1984); MCI
Communications Corp. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 79-1182, 1983 WL 1881 (D.D.C. Oct.
4, 1983); Investment Co. Inst. v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 1213 (D.D.C. 1982); Ramamurti v.
Rolls-Royce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407 (D.D.C. 1978); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Maclaren, 191 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 498 (D.D.C. 1976); Lex Tex Ltd. v. Skillman, 579 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1990); Hughes v. A.H.
Robins Co., 490 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1985); Beachboard v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 475 A.2d 398
(D.C. 1984).
142. 490 A.2d 1140 (D.C. 1985).
143. 579 A.2d 244 (D.C. 1990).
144. 475 A.2d 398 (D.C. 1984).
145. Hughes, 490 A.2d at 1145 n.4. In Hughes, a non-resident defendant corporation, A.H.
Robins, established an office and staffed two employees in the District of Columbia in order to
monitor the introduction and passage of congressional legislation affecting the pharmaceutical
industry. Id. at 1143. Additionally, while A.H. Robins did on previous occasions enter into
contracts with the federal government, these contracts were negotiated and agreed to outside of the
District of Columbia. Id. Nevertheless, the court's determination of the applicability of the
government contacts exception in this case seemed superfluous in light of the fact that the court held
that the non-resident defendant's contacts fell short of the due process requirements as set forth in
InternationalShoe. See id. at 1151.
146. The Lex Tex court found it controlling that at the time that the non-resident defendant
appeared before the United States Patent and Trademark Office, that office was located in the
District of Columbia. Lex Tex, 579 A.2d at 244. However, the court did note that the Patent and
Trademark Office moved to Arlington, Virginia in 1967. Id. at 245 n. 1. Whether this fact would
have become relevant for jurisdictional purposes had the non-resident attorney's activities taken place
after 1967 is unclear in the opinion. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 192.
147. Id. at 249-50.
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the fact that the attorney's only contact was the representation of his client
before the PTO, a governmental agency, the court nevertheless reasoned that the
attorney was not exercising his first amendment rights when he appeared before
the PTO."
Holding the non-resident attorney amenable to suit did not
implicate his first amendment rights, and therefore did not invoke an analysis
of the government contacts exception under the Rose decision. 49 Finally, in
Beachboard, even though the government contacts exception was not considered
by the court because the cause of action had no connection whatsoever to any
transaction of business by the non-resident defendant within the District of
Columbia, the court in dictum did, however, recognize Rose as an authority on
the government contacts exception.'o
While the District of Columbia Court's decisions that were rendered
subsequent to Rose have generally maintained that the Rose decision is
controlling with regard to the government contacts exception, the federal courts
of the District of Columbia Circuit are anything but consistent on this issue.'
Many of the decisions that have arisen out of the federal courts for the District
of Columbia Circuit have preferred a broad application of the exception.' 52
As a result, some of these decisions have renewed the vitality of the
Environmental Research opinion, while some other decisions within the District
of Columbia Circuit have attempted to hedge this renewal process. I
D. The Federal Courts of the Districtof Columbia CircuitAfter Environmental
Research and Rose: An Open Invitation?
When analyzing the federal court decisions that involve the government
contacts exception, a noticeable trend emerges in favor of a broad interpretation
of the exception as did the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in
Environmental Research, irrespective of the decision in Rose. 5 4
Notwithstanding this trend to liberally apply the exception, many of the federal
court cases still remain divided on the scope of the exception. 5 For example,

148. Id. at 249.
149. Id. at 250.
150. Beachboard v. Trustees of Columbia Univ., 475 A.2d 398, 401 n.3 (D.C. 1984).
151. See Butler, supra note 10, at 752-57.
152. See id. at 752-53 (stating that the federal courts for the District of Columbia Circuit have
preferred a broad interpretation of the exception's applicability).
153. See, e.g., Johns v. Rozet, 770 F. Supp. 11, 19 (D.D.C. 1991); United States v. Wilfred
Am. Educ. Corp., No. 86-333, 1987 WL 10501, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1987).
154. See Butler, supra note 10, at 752-53.
155. See, e.g., Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 786-87 (D.C. Cir. 1983),
cen. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984). The court stated that the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
has failed to clarify any possible conflict [between Environmental Research and Rose]
• . . [, but that] [flortunately, if there is any tension between Environmental Research
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in Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt," the court began its discussion of the
exception by commenting on the complications generated by the prior
inconsistent decisions and criticized the District's courts' failure to clarify the
scope of the exception.' 57 The court continued, stating:
[C]onsidering that a panel of the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals 'is prohibited from issuing an opinion which conflicts
materially with a prior decision of the full court as this may be done
only by the court sitting en banc . . . if it were necessary to
determine what law controls today in the District of Columbia, [this
court] would still be hesitant to conclude that the clear holding against

and Rose, [the court] need not resolve it, because in this case all relevant activities upon
which [the plaintiff] seeks to base its claim . . . implicate the first amendment
guarantee 'to petition the Government for redress of grievances' and would therefore
qualify for exemption under [EnvironmentalResearch and] the Rose test as well.
Id. at 786-87. See also Nichols v. G.D. Searle & Co., 783 F. Supp. 233, 242 (D. Md. 1992)
(stating that the law regarding the government contacts exception is in a state of confusion and that
the decisions following the Rose decision have done nothing to clarify the District of Columbia's
position); Rochon v. F.B.I., 691 F. Supp. 1548, 1559-60 (D.D.C. 1988) ("The [government
contacts] doctrine does not provide a blanket exception for all government contacts . . .");
Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Federal Land Bank of Tex., Nos. 87-0085, 87-0601, 1987 WL
10518, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1987) (stating that the federal courts in the District of Columbia
Circuit recognize a "possible conflict in [the] District of Columbia case law regarding the scope of
the government contacts doctrine" caused by the en banc decision in EnvironmentalResearch and
the panel decision in Rose, but "for present purposes it is unnecessary to decide which one of these
District of Columbia Court of Appeals decisions controls"); Chrysler Corp. v. General Motors
Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1198 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that "[since Rose there has been no
consistent approach in applying the government contacts exception"); Chase v. Pan-Pacific
Broadcasting, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1414, 1426-28 (D.D.C. 1985) (stating that while there is an
unresolved conflict, the court recognized the Rose decision and took care so as not to "contravene
the holding in Rose and abridge the defendant's freedom of speech or right to petition the
government"). But see Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1385
(D.D.C. 1986) ("[Tjhis court must determine which formulation of the government contacts]
exception should be applied . . . [and] [this [cl]ourt agrees that the Environmental Research
formulation is applicable . .
"); National Coal Ass'n, et al. v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668, 671
(D.D.C. 1984) ("Although the articulation and application of the government contacts exception.
• . may have been somewhat inconsistent over the years, the federal Court of Appeals for [the
District of Columbia] Circuit . . . concluded . .. that this exception applies to contacts with all
branches of the federal government. . . .") (citations omitted); United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ.
Corp., No. 86-333, 1987 WL 10501, at *4 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1987) ("Our review of the cases leads
us to conclude, however, that the categorical governmental contacts rule, though not explicitly
overruled, has not survived."); American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639 (D.D.C. 1987) ("While the District of Columbia courts have not
clarified the law or delimited the scope of this exception . . . this circuit has indicated that courts
should consider both prongs of the exception. .. ").
156. 722 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1210 (1984).
157. Id. at 786.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [1996], Art. 6

1052

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

governmental contacts as a basis for personal jurisdiction in
15 8
Environmental Research no longer controls.
Many of the decisions in the circuit following Naartex were quick to
employ the court's language advising that the Environmental Research decision
was still controlling. 59
For instance, in National Coal Association v.
Clark,16 the court stated that the government contacts exception applies to all
contacts with the federal government."6 However, in Chase v. Pan-Pacific
Broadcasting, Inc.,62 even though the case did not apply the government
contacts exception, the decision is significant because the court recognized the
Rose decision as precedent, and because the court reasoned its decision in part
under the rubric of the Rose decision."

158. Id. However, the court found it unnecessary to make that determination because the court
reasoned that the non-resident's contacts, petitioning the government to protect the non-resident's
property interests, were covered not only by Environmental Research, but also by the more
restrictive holding in Rose as well. The court stated:
Fortunately, if there is any tension between EnvironmentalResearch and Rose, we need
not resolve it, because in this case all relevant activities upon which [the plaintiff] seeks
to base its claim[,] . . . implicate the first amendment guarantee "to petition the
Government for redress of grievances" and so would qualify for exemption under the
Rose test as well.
Id.at 787.
159. The primary reason the Naarrex court counseled that the EnvironmentalResearch decision
was still controlling was that a decision reached by a court sitting en banc cannot be overruled
except by another court also sitting en banc. Id. at 786. See supra note 138.
160. 603 F. Supp. 668 (D.D.C. 1984).
161. Id. at 671. The court noted that:
The government contacts exception exempts from consideration . . . a non-resident
defendant['s] [contacts] . . . which are made solely with the federal government
...
. Although the articulation and application of the government contacts exception
by the local Court of Appeals may have been somewhat inconsistent over the years, the
Federal Court of Appeals for this Circuit recently concluded upon a careful analysis of
the District of Columbia case law both that the government contacts exception remains
the law in the District of Columbia and that this exception applies to contacts with all
branches of the federal government. ...
Id. (citing Naartex, 722 F.2d at 786-87). In applying the exception, the court ruled that the
exception barred jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant whose contacts with the government
involved actively securing personal economic and proprietary interests. Id. at 672.
162. 617 F. Supp. 1414 (D.D.C. 1985).
163. See id.at 1428.
[Olur decision [does not] contravene the holding in Rose and abridge the defendants[']
freedom of speech or right to petition the government ....
[T~his is not a case where
.. . the defendant is forced to enter this forum to exercise his first amendment rights
... . Therefore, we do not believe that constitutional concerns require this court to
invoke the government contacts [exception].
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More recent examples of the government contacts exception dilemma
include Coalitionon Sensible Transportation, Inc. v. Dole,'" United States v.
Wilfred American Education Corp.,' and Johns v. Rozet.66 In Coalition,
the court noted that the Naartex decision "strongly suggested" that the
Environmental Research decision was controlling. 67
Nevertheless, the
Coalition court decided that it should "determine which formulation of the
exception [that this court] should . . . appl[y].""
Not surprisingly, the
Coalition court held that the Environmental Research decision was
controlling." 6 Conversely, in Wilfred, "[the court's] review of the cases [led]
[the court] to conclude . . . that the categorical governmental contacts rule,
though not explicitly overruled, ha[d] not survived."" 7 Similarly, in Johns,
the court stated that "[t]he government contacts exception . . . apparently is
based on the First Amendment, and . . . [therefore] 'the First Amendment
provides the only principled basis for exempting a foreign defendant from suit
in the District of Columbia, when its contacts are . . . sufficient to withstand
a traditional due process attack.'""'
In summary, although there exists a stark conflict surrounding the
applicable scope of the government contacts exception, categories of contacts
that generally fall within the exception, outside the exception, and on middle
ground, can loosely be defined. On the one hand, there are contacts that will
necessarily fall within the exception regardless of whether Environmental
Research or Rose is deemed controlling. These contacts are those which
necessarily implicate First Amendment concerns, which include:
newsgathering"7 and lobbying and petitioning the government.' 73

164. 631 F. Supp. 1382 (D.D.C. 1986).
165. No. 86-333, 1987WL 10501 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1987).
166. 770 F. Supp. 11 (D.D.C. 1991).
167. Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (D.D.C. 1986).
Cf. National Coal Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp. 668, 671-72 (D.D.C. 1984) (stating that the Naartex
decision was conclusive on whether Environmental Research should be controlling).
168. Coalition, 631 F. Supp. at 1384-85.
169. Id. at 1385.
170. United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., No. 86-333, 1987 WL 10501 at *4 (D.D.C.
Apr. 23 1987).
171. Johns v. Rozet, 770 F. Supp. 11, 19 (D.D.C. 1991) (quoting Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d
1368, 1374 (D.C. 1978), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979)).
172. See, e.g., Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C. Cir. 1932); Layne
v. Tribune Co., 71 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1934). But see Ricketts v. Sun Printing & Publ.
Ass'n, 27 App. D.C. 222 (1906) (holding a non-resident newspaper amenable to suit because the
newspaper generated income through sales of its paper in the District of Columbia from the news
it gathered about the national government while in the District of Columbia).
173. See, e.g., Hayhurst v. Calabrese, No. 92-7017, 1993 WL 64561 at *1 (D.C. Cir. Feb.
25, 1993) (holding that the non-resident defendants' lobbying of the government fell within the
government contacts exception); Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir.
1983) (holding that petitioning the government to protect personal proprietary interests from
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On the other hand, there exists a group of contacts that generally fall
outside the scope of the government contacts exception. These contacts include:
directly conducting business with the government, 74 using information
obtained about the government for income generating purposes within the
District of Columbia," hiring District of Columbia counsel when the
applicable law or regulation does not mandate that local counsel necessarily be
hired, 76 and conducting business in the District of Columbia that only

governmental legislation was under the purview of the government contacts exception), cert. denied,
467 U.S. 1210 (1984). See also Rose v. Silver, 394 A.2d 1368, 1373-74 (D.C. 1978) (stating that
the First Amendment provides the only principled basis on which to apply the government contacts
exception), reh'g denied, 398 A.2d 787 (D.C. 1979).
174. See, e.g., Rochon v. F.B.I., 691 F. Supp. 1548, 1559-60 (D.D.C. 1988) (holding that
employees of the government who worked in the District of Columbia could not use the government
contacts exception to defeat personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia); Ramamurti v. RollsRoyce Ltd., 454 F. Supp. 407, 411 (D.D.C. 1978) (stating that there is nothing unseemly in
subjecting [non-resident] corporations to personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia when those
corporations' contacts with the District involve substantial commercial relations with the federal
government acting in its proprietary capacity); Federal Land Bank of St. Paul v. Federal Land Bank
of Tex., Civ. A. Nos. 87-0085, 87-0601, 1987 WL 10518, at *3 (D.D.C. Apr. 30, 1987) (holding
that meetings with the government in the District of Columbia regarding the procurement of funds
were not exempt from the jurisdictional calculus despite the government contacts exception). But
see Coalition on Sensible Transp., Inc. v. Dole, 631 F. Supp. 1382, 1385 (D.D.C. 1986) (holding
that a non-resident corporation who had contacted the federal government to procure federal funds
for a construction project was exempted from personal jurisdiction in the District of Columbia
because of the government contacts exception); Siam Kraft Paper Co. v. Parsons & Whittemore,
Inc.., 400 F. Supp. 810, 812 (D.D.C. 1975) (holding that a non-resident corporation that had taken
advantage of services offered to prospective foreign investors by the government was not amenable
to suit in the District of Columbia because of the government contacts exception).
175. See, e.g., Ricketta v. Sun Printing & Publ. Ass'n, 27 App. D.C. 222 (1906) (holding a
non-resident newspaper amenable to suit because the newspaper generated income through sales of
its paper in the District of Columbia from the news it gathered about the national government while
in the District of Columbia). But see Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co., 62 F.2d 873, 875 (D.C.
Cir. 1932) (holding that a non-resident newspaper was not amenable to suit in the District of
Columbia for mere news-gathering with respect to the national government); Layne v. Tribune Co.,
71 F.2d 223, 224 (D.C. Cir. 1934) (holding that the non-resident newspaper was not amenable to
suit in the District of Columbia for gathering news about the national government because it
generated income from the sale of this information in forums other than the District of Columbia).
176. See, e.g., Chase v. Pan-Pacific Broadcasting, Inc., 617 F. Supp. 1414, 1426-28 (D.D.C.
1985) (holding that the government contacts exception did not exempt a non-resident corporation
from suit in the District of Columbia because the corporation hired a District of Columbia attorney
to represent the corporation before the FCC; the FCC's regulations did not require the hiring of
local counsel for representation and therefore, the defendant was amenable to suit because its hiring
of the local attorney constituted a sufficient "contact"); Bechtel & Cole v. Graceland Broadcasting
Inc., No. 92-7190, 1994 WL 85047, at *2 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 9, 1994) (stating that the act of hiring
local counsel to represent a non-resident defendant before governmental regulatory proceedings is
not mandatory, but discretionary, and therefore falls outside the government contacts exception).
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peripherally involves the government.'
Finally, there are group contacts that fall into an amorphous middle
area." T This area is comprised of contacts that may or may not have been
included within the exception, but were decided under the auspices of
Environmental Research. These contacts include: contacts with the government
or its agencies that do not necessarily implicate the First Amendment,"7
contacts with the government that allegedly perpetrate inequitable conduct,"s
filing documents with the government or one of its agencies,"8 ' and contacts

177. See, e.g., Stabilisierungsfonds Fur Wein v. Kaiser Stuhi Wine Distribs. Ltd., 647 F.2d
200, 205 n.ll (D.C. Cir. 1981) (stating that the non-resident defendant's contacts with the federal
government were part of a larger aggregation of contacts that were not with the government and
therefore, the government contacts exception was inapplicable); Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803
F. Supp. 428, 435-37 (D.D.C. 1992) (same); Johns v. Rozet, 770 F. Supp. 11, 19 (D.D.C. 1991)
(same); Brown v. Artery Org., Inc., 654 F. Supp. 1106, 1111 (D.D.C. 1987) (same); Chrysler
Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 589 F. Supp. 1182, 1199 (D.D.C. 1984) (same). See also LexTex
Ltd. v. Skillman, 579 A.2d 244, 250 (D.C. 1990) (stating that a non-resident attorney whose only
contacts were with the federal government could not invoke the government contacts exception to
preclude jurisdiction because the attorney was not representing his own personal interests while in
the District of Columbia, but was doing business in the District of Columbia for client).
178. See Butler, supra note 10, at 754-57.
179. See, e.g., Mueller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F.2d 142, 143 (D.C. Cir.
1945) (stating that the government contacts exception precludes jurisdiction on contacts that consist
of the monitoring of the national government's activities); Traher v. De Havilland Aircraft of
Canada, Ltd., 294 F.2d 229 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (same); National Coal Ass'n v. Clark, 603 F. Supp.
668, 672 (D.D.C. 1984) (same); Hughes v. A.H. Robins Co., 490 A.2d 1140, 1145 n.4 (D.C.
1985) (same). See also Environmental Research v. Lockwood Greene Eng'rs, Inc., 355 A.2d 808,
813-14 (D.C. 1976) (en banc) (holding that the government contacts exception applies to all contacts
that a non-resident defendant has with the national government or its agencies).
180. See Naartex Consulting Corp. v. Watt, 722 F.2d 779, 787 (D.C. Cir. 1983) ("A different
case might [have been] presented [in favor of finding personal jurisdiction despite the government
contacts exception] had [there been] . . . credible and specific allegations in the district court that
the companies had used the proceedings as an instrumentality of. . .alleged fraud."). But see
American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639-40
(D.D.C. 1987) (applying the government contacts exception to deny personal jurisdiction over the
non-resident defendant despite the plaintiff's allegation that the non-resident defendant used the
proceedings in the Patent and Trademark Office as an instrumentality of fraud).
181. See, e.g., Armco Steel Co. v. CSX Corp., 790 F. Supp. 311, 321 (D.D.C. 1991) (stating
that filings with the ICC in the District of Columbia do not stand as a basis for asserting personal
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant because of the government contacts exception); American
Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639-40 (D.D.C. 1987)
(holding that the filing of a trademark with the United States Patent and Trademark Office is not a
sufficient "minimum contact" on which to assert jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant because
of the government contacts exception); Investment Co. Inst. v. United States, 550 F. Supp. 1213,
1217 (D.D.C. 1982) (holding that a non-resident defendant's contacts with the District of Columbia
by filing documents with the SEC are excluded from the jurisdictional calculus because of the
government contacts exception, and that such filings are an exercise of the non-resident defendant's
first amendment rights); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Maclaren, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 498, 502 (D.D.C.
1976) (stating that a non-resident defendant's prosecution of his patent application in the United
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with a governmental agency that is no longer located in the District of
Columbia. s" This area is also representative of fact situations that are
affected by the unresolved issue of the Rose and Environmental Research
decisions' respective control.
IV. A

SPECIFIC PROBLEM:

CONTACTS WITH THE

PTO

REGARDING

U.S. PATENTS

A. The Inequities of Sheltering Tangential Issues Regarding United States
PatentApplications by ForeignNationalswithin the "Government Contacts
Exception"
As previously mentioned in the hypothetical in Section I of this Note,"
the application of the government contacts exception in disputes involving
tangential issues affecting foreign applications for a United States patent presents
an inequitable situation."4 Recall that in the hypothetical, the foreign patentee
of a United States patent was not amenable to suit in any other jurisdiction
Recall also that the foreign patentee could
except the District of Columbia.'
only be amenable to suit in the District of Columbia for core issues'
regarding the patent, and was not amenable to suit in the District of Columbia
for tangential issues' regarding that same patent because of the applicability
of the government contacts exception." s These conclusions are based on
several factors. First, claims that directly affect the legal existence of a United
States patent are governed by federal law." 9 Conversely, claims involving the
ownership of a patent, which are tangential to the legal existence of the patent

States Patent and Trademark Office cannot provide a basis for jurisdiction because of the government
contacts exception). But see United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., No. 86-333, 1987 WL
10501, at *5 (D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1987) (stating that the government contacts exception is not
applicable to a non-resident defendant's contacts with the District of Columbia by filing documents
with the government because "[iut stretches the concept of a 'petition' to apply the petition clause
to these ministerial contacts" whose chilling effect "is non-existent because the contacts . . . are
not based on ... lobbying efforts").
182. See Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 435 n.5 (D.D.C. 1992) (noting that
a different result might have been reached if the non-resident defendants' contacts were only with
the OMC, which has its official address in the District of Columbia, but which is physically located
in Rosslyn, Virginia); Lex Tex Ltd. v. Skillman, 579 A.2d 244, 245 n.1 (D.C. 1990) (stating that
the decision was based upon the fact that the United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) was
located during "all relevant times" of the case in the District of Columbia, but also noting that the
PTO had moved to Arlington, Virginia in 1967 which was after the "relevant times" of the case).
183. See supra text accompanying notes 23-31.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 32-33.
185. See supra text accompanying note 28.
186. See supra note 27.
187. See id.
188. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
189. See supra note 27.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol30/iss3/6

Schiefelbein: Accepting an Exception to the "Government Contacts Exception" of

1996]

GOVERNMENT CONTACTS EXCEPTION

1057

itself, are governed by state law."' ° Therefore, a plaintiff claiming the
ownership of a United States patent that is held by a foreign patentee must
necessarily base that claim on a state's substantive law, and must also employ
that state's long-arm statute, namely in this case, the District of Columbia's
long-arm statute, in order to effectuate personal jurisdiction over that foreign
patentee. ' 9'
In examining the foreign patentee's amenability to suit in the District of
Columbia, recall in the hypothetical that the only contact that the foreign
patentee had with any United States jurisdiction was the filing of a patent
application with the PTO, a governmental agency, in the District of
Columbia." 9 Accordingly, because the hypothetical foreign patentee's only

190. See id.
191. See, e.g., Dooley v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 433 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating
that if federal law does not provide for personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant, then
an independentbasis for personal jurisdiction, namely the state long-arm statute, must be employed).
192. See supra text accompanying note 28. Interestingly, the PTO is located in Arlington,
Virginia and has been since April of 1967. See Lex Tex Ltd., v. Skillman, 579 A.2d 244, 245 n.1
(D.C. 1990). This fact alone would seem to remove the PTO from the purview of the government
contacts exception because the PTO is no longer located in the District of Columbia's jurisdiction.
Therefore, it would follow that any contacts that a non-resident defendant had with the PTO would
be analyzed under the Virginia long-arm statute, which does not have a "government contacts
exception".
Nonetheless, the case law in the District of Columbia post-1967 still regards the PTO as being
in the District of Columbia, and therefore, susceptible to the government contacts exception. To
date, no explicit reasoning either for, or against, the continual treatment of the PTO as still being
within the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia has been advanced. See, e.g., U.S. Indus., Inc.
v. Maclaren, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 498, 502 (D.D.C. 1976) (denying personal jurisdiction over a
non-resident defendant whose only contacts with the District were with the PTO when that nonresident prosecuted a patent application because "the law is clear . . . that contacts with federal
agencies in the District of Columbia do not constitute 'doing business' within the meaning of the
District of Columbia long-arm statute") (emphasis added); American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary
Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637, 1639-40 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that a non-resident,
whose only contact with the Districtof Columbia was filing an application for a trademark with the
PTO, was not amenable to suit because of the government contacts exception). But see Lex Tex,
579 A.2d at 244-45 (noting that the United States Patent and Trademark Office was "located at all
relevant times [for purposes of the suit] in the District of Columbia" (emphasis added)).
It could be deduced from the Lex Tex decision that if the non-resident defendant's contacts with
the FTO occurred post-1967, after the PTO moved to Arlington, Virginia, the District of Columbia
long-arm statute and the government contacts exception should no longer be applicable. C. Dooley
v. United Tech. Corp., 803 F. Supp. 428, 435 & n.5 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that the non-resident
defendants' contacts with the District of Columbia did not involve just meeting with the federal
government, therefore, the court did not need to consider the issue of "whether the OMC, the situs
of the defendant's licensing amendment filing, is located for jurisdictional purposes at its official
address in the District of Columbia or at its physical location in Rosslyn, Virginia"). Whether such
an argument would effectively remove a non-resident defendant's contacts with the PTO from the
purview of the government contacts exception is difficult to ascertain from the case law.
Nevertheless, the possibility of proffering such a technical argument still remains.
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contact was with the government via the PTO, the government contacts
exception would apply and thereby preclude the assertion of personal
jurisdiction."i Barring further contact in the District of Columbia, other than
additional contacts with the PTO or another governmental instrumentality, or
with any other jurisdiction in the United States, the hypothetical foreign patentee
is not amenable to suit involving those tangential issues concerning the patent
such as ownership." 9 As a result, the hypothetical foreign patentee is able to
avoid the obligation of defending a suit regarding the ownership of the patent
and can continue to hold out on the ownership rights to the United States
patent. 9 5
The irony is that the hypothetical foreign patentee has unjustly secured the
rights to a United States patent by way of the United States patent law, but the
applicability of the District of Columbia government contacts exception to
challenge those rights provides for a fortuitous result for the hypothetical foreign
applicant by shielding that patentee from suit regarding the tangential issue of

193. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
194. See, e.g., American Standard, Inc. v. Sanitary Wares Mfg. Corp., 3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1637, 1639-40 (D.D.C. 1987); U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Maclaren, 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 498, 502
(D.D.C. 1976). These additional contacts by the foreign patentee would of course be subject to the
government contacts exception if they occurred in the District of Columbia. However, if the
additional contacts occurred outside the District of Columbia, the plaintiff would need to employ the
long-arm statute of the forum in which the additional contacts occurred. Nevertheless, if the foreign
patentee knows that these additional contacts will subject him or her to personal jurisdiction in the
forum which they occur, the foreign patentee will be reluctant to pursue them, and will avoid the
creation of those contacts.
On the other hand, a cause of action for challenging the patent's validity could be brought by
the plaintiff against the foreign patentee, assuming that a viable invalidity claim actually existed in
fact. The issue of patent (in)validity is, of course, a federal patent law claim, thus allowing the suit
to be brought in federal court. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (1988). Once the federal claim for patent
invalidity is alleged, the claimant could attempt to bring the ownership claim before the federal court
under a theory of pendent subject matter jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1988). However,
the claimant would nevertheless need to employ the District of Columbia long-arm statute for the
ownership claim because the federal courts of the District of Columbia Circuit, while acknowledging
the theory of pendent subject matter jurisdiction, do not correspondingly acknowledge an analogous
concept of pendent personal jurisdiction. See Connors v. Marontha Coal Co., 670 F. Supp. 45, 47
(D.D.C. 1987) (holding that there is no concept of "pendent personal jurisdiction"). But see Oetiker
v. Jurid Werke, G.m.b.H., 556 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (stating that there is a concept of "pendent
personal jurisdiction"). Therefore, if the concept of pendent personal jurisdiction does not exist, an
independent basis for personal jurisdiction for the state law ownership claim must be asserted. See
Connors, 670 F. Supp. at 47. Consequently, an attempt to allege patent invalidity in order to
circumvent the District of Columbia long-arm statute and the government contacts exception would
fail because the employment of the District of Columbia long-arm statute will still be required
regardless of whether the state claim is the sole issue sued upon, or is the subject of pendent
jurisdiction. See id.
195. See supra note 33.
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ownership.'
The damage created by this inequity can be evidenced in
several different ways. First, an owner of a United States patent is not required
by law to sell or actually produce the patented invention."9 Patents can be
used for the sole purpose of suppressing the invention from use."g Since a
dispute as to ownership of a patent does not affect the validity of the patent, 199
absent the creation of additional contacts by the hypothetical foreign patentee or
pendent jurisdiction on a patent validity or patent infringement claim, the
hypothetical foreign patentee would not be subject to personal jurisdiction in the
United States regarding the ownership claim.'
If these additional grounds
for personal jurisdiction are unavailing, the hypothetical foreign patentee can
cause the putative patent owner to lose the royalties and the benefits of a legal
monopoly that might otherwise have been conferred."'
Moreover, the
putative patent owner loses his or her initial investment to research and develop
the invention.
While the hypothetical may seem fictitious, the inequities are very much
real. The hypothetical situation has occurred in the context of patents within the
jurisdiction of the District of Columbia.
In U.S. Industries, Inc. v.
Maclaren, ° a dispute arose over a foreign defendant's ownership of a United
States patent. The case was dismissed for a lack of personal jurisdiction over

196. This is assuming that the foreign applicant does not establish further contacts in the United

States in hopes of benefitting from the ownership of the patent. See supra note 194.

197. See Special Equip. Co. v. Coe, 324 U.S. 370, 378-79 (1945).
The patent grant is not of a right to the patentee to use the invention, for that he already
possesses.. . . By the very terms of the [patent] statute the grant is nothing more than
a means of preventing others, except under license from the patentee, from appropriating
his invention .... This Court has consistently held that failure of the patentee to make
use of a patented invention does not affect the validity of the patent....
frequently been asked to change the policy .
, but has not done so.

Congress has

Id.
198. Id.

See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT, PATENT, TRADEMARK AND RELATED STATE

DOCTRINES 496-97 (3d ed. 1993) (stating that it is not unusual for patent owners to use their
patented inventions for "mercenary" suppression).
199. See supra note 27.
200. See supra note 194.
201. A patent, like other forms of property, can be freely transferred. See 35 U.S.C. § 261
(1988); CHIsUM & JACOBS, supra note 24, § 2G, at 2-305. Section 154 of the Patent Act grants:
[To the patentee, his heirs or assigns, . . . the right to exclude others from making,
using, . . . or selling the invention throughout the United States . .. , and, if the
invention is a process, . . . the right to exclude others from using . . . or selling
throughout the United States, or importing into the United States, products made by that
process, referring to the specification for the particulars thereof.
35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). For a discussion of the specificities of the rights granted to the owner of
a patent, see generally CHISUM & JACOBS, supra note 24, at 2-213-33.
202. 191 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 498 (D.D.C. 1976).
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the non-resident defendant.20 3 The court reasoned that the foreign defendant's
contacts, the filing of a patent application in the PTO, fell squarely within the
government contacts exception.'
The court stated that:
[The defendant's] prosecut[ion] [of] his patent application in the Patent
[and Trademark] Office during a two year period of time... [cannot
confer jurisdiction,] for the law is clear in this Circuit that contacts
with federal agencies in the District of Columbia do not constitute
"transacting business" within the meaning of the District of Columbia
long arm statute. 20 5
Additionally, although not dealing directly with a patent dispute, American
StandardInc. v. Sanitary Wares Manufacturing Corp. " provides an additional
example of the inequities caused by the application of the government contacts
exception to a non-resident defendant's contacts with the PTO. In American
Standard, personal jurisdiction was defeated through the application of the
government contacts exception even though the plaintiff based the assertion of
jurisdiction on the non-resident defendant's actions giving rise to the claim
itself.2 7 The American Standard court reasoned, as did the court in U.S.
Industries, that "[u]nder the 'government contact' exception that has been carved
out of the District of Columbia long-arm statute,... personal jurisdiction may

not be based solely upon contacts with the federal government."'
Therefore,
the non-resident defendant's only contacts with the District of Columbia were
excepted from the jurisdictional calculus, even though those contacts solely gave
rise to the plaintiff's claims.mg
B. National Patent Development Corp. v. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd.:
A Sub Silentio Resolution?
Within the Patent Act, Congress has enacted 35 U.S.C. § 293 to "provide
at least one available forum where persons charged with infringement of a
United States patent held by a person residing abroad may file an action for a
declaratory judgment of invalidity and/or non-infringement."210 Section 293
serves as a mandatory extraterritorial long-arm statute to hale non-resident
foreign defendants into the District Court for the District of Columbia if

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.

Id. at 502.
Id.
Id.
3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1637 (D.D.C. 1987).
Id. at 1639-40.
Id. at 1639.
Id. at 163940.
See 6 CHISUM, supra note 27, § 21.02[3][d], at 21-110.
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designation of a United States citizen has not been made in order to effectuate
service of process.2 ' Section 293 requires that if that designation has not
been made, then the District Court for the District of Columbia will have
personal jurisdiction over the foreign applicant and that jurisdiction will confer
on the District Court the authority "to take any action respecting the patent or
rights thereunder . .

,212

Since the codification of § 293, the case law from the District of Columbia
Circuit cases have consistently held that § 293 can only be used in cases that
principally involve federal patent law. 21 3 In other words, § 293 can be used
only to gain jurisdiction over a foreign applicant in disputes that involve core
patent law issues such as patent validity, patent misuse, and/or patent
infringement." 4 As a result, any state law claims involving tangential issues
with respect to the patent brought in federal court must have a separate basis for
personal jurisdiction over the non-resident defendant."' Accordingly, personal
jurisdiction must be effectuated through the invocation of a state long-arm

211. 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1988). Section 293 states in pertinent part:
Every patentee not residing in the United States may file in the Patent and Trademark
Office a written designation stating the name and address of a person residing within the
United States on whom may be served process or notice of proceedings affecting the
patent or rights thereunder. If the person designated cannot be found at the address
given in the last designation, or if no person has been designated, the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia shall have jurisdiction and summons shall be
served by publication or otherwise as the court directs. The court shall have the same
jurisdiction to take any action respecting the patent or rights thereunder that it would
have if the patentee were personally within the jurisdiction of the court.
Id.
212. Id.
213. See, e.g., Piker Lab., Inc. v. Gist-Brocades N.V., 636 F.2d 772, 778 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(noting that § 293 cannot be used to confer personal jurisdiction over a foreign patentee in a dispute
that merely involves ownership of a patent); Neidhart v. Neidhart S.A., 510 F.2d 760, 763-64 (D.C.
Cir. 1975). The court in Neidharr stated:
Since its enactment, section 293 has been primarily invoked in cases where plaintiffs
sought declaratory judgments involving patent validity or infringement ....
[A]bsent a more definitive indication of Congressional intent, we cannot hold that
license agreement controversies are among the situations embraced by section 293 . .
. . The instant cases, while termed patent license agreement controversies, are, quite
simply, contract disputes. . . . Appellants plainly have no rights under the patents;
their rights, if any, are only those emanating from the "four comers" of their respective
agreements . . . . In sum, we hold that where plaintiffs seek merely to resolve the
existence, vel non, of patent license agreements and their rights thereunder, section 293
is not available to effectuate service of process on nonresident patentees.
Id. at 763-65.
214. Riker, 636 F.2d at 778; Neidhart, 510 F.2d at 763.
215. See supra note 191.
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statute, and subject matter jurisdiction must be based either supplementally on
a federal question or diversity of the parties.2" 6
Despite § 293's original inapplicability to state law claims, the case of
National Patent Development Corp. v. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd.2 7 overruled
the precedent that distinguished § 293's applicability between federal patent law
claims that effect the legality of the patent, and state law claims, such as
ownership disputes, that only tangentially effect the patent.2"8 National Patent
held that § 293 could be invoked to provide a basis for personal jurisdiction over
a foreign patentee in all disputes related to a patent, including disputes that
solely concern state law. 219 The court reasoned that:
[A] suit over patent ownership [surely] respects or affects rights under
a patent: if one does not own a patent, one certainly lacks the rights
of a patentee. In this regard, a suit over patent ownership affects
rights under the patent at least as much as a suit claiming patent
misuse, and does so more permanently .. . . The sparse legislative
history [of § 293] is of little help, . . . [but] [i]f anything, however,
that history might fairly be read to support a more generous
construction of the statute. The most telling piece of history is a
comment by the Department of State ....
"The Department
understands that this provision has been added for the benefit of
American residents desiring to bring action against foreign owners of
United States patents. At the present time American manufacturers
threatened by charges of infringement of United States patents by
persons resident abroad are especially handicapped by inability to
bring suit for declaratory judgment. "'
The court continued its analysis by clarifying the confusion that prior courts
had in construing the applicable boundaries of § 293. " In dismissing the
earlier courts' contentions and concerns in applying § 293 to state law claims,
the court stated that:

216. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) (authorizing federal subject matter jurisdiction in federal
court with regard to a federal law question); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (Supp. V. 1993) (authorizing federal
subject matter jurisdiction based upon the diversity of the parties and the amount in controversy).
In the hypothetical, the long-arm statute of the District of Columbia would be employed and the
Federal District Court would have subject matter jurisdiction based on 28 U.S.C. § 1338 (diversity).
See supra notes 28-29 and accompanying text.
217. 877 F.2d 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (en bane).
218. Id. at 1009-10.
219. Id.
220. Id. at 1007-08 (citations omitted).
221. National Patent Dev. Corp. v. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd., 877 F.2d 1003, 1008-09 (D.C.
Cir. 1989) (en bane).
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Section 293 does not supply subject matter jurisdiction; that
fundamental competence must be based, ordinarily, on diversity...
or on a federal question . . . . It is therefore fair and reasonable to
require such a party to respond here-i.e., in federal court in our
nation's capital, where the party has registered its patents-in
proceedings, whether arising underfederal or state law, concerning
the U.S-registered patent.'
The significance of the National Patent decision is that it permits personal
jurisdiction to be asserted over a foreign patentee by the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, absent designation, in disputes that involve
the core issues of federal patent law as well as disputes that involve tangential
issues such as the ownership of a patent. m Moreover, the court made it clear
that § 293 could also be used to authorize personal jurisdiction over a foreign
patentee in disputes brought in federal court that involve solely state law
claims. ' 4 The only prerequisites of using § 293 according to the National
Patent court that are imposed on the plaintiff are those required by the subject
matter jurisdiction statutes regarding a federal question or diversity.'m Thus,
a plaintiff can invoke the Patent Act's § 293 long-arm statute over a foreign
patentee even though the plaintiff's claim is not grounded whatsoever in federal
26
patent law. =
Upon critical examination of the National Patent decision, two interesting
aspects emerge. First, National Patent only summarily addressed the issue of
§ 293's applicability to suits that exclusively involve state law claims, and cited
no precedent for its expansion of § 293.227 Second, the National Patent

222. Id. at 1009-10.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1010.
225. National Patent Dev. Corp. v. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd., 877 F.2d 1003, 1009 (D.C.
Cir. 1989). See supra text accompanying note 222.
226. Id. at 1009-10.
227. The only precedent that the NationalPatent court cited for its expansion of § 293's scope
was a Department of State report. See id. at 1008. The court contended that the history of this
report "might fairly be read to support a more generous construction of [§ 293]." Id. However,
Professor Chisum states:
The [National Patent] court's argument as to the meaning of [the Department of State's]
'especially handicapped' [language] is strained. The apparent meaning of "especially
handicapped" was to compare American manufacturers threatened by infringement
charges by domestic owners of United States patents with American manufacturers
threatened by foreign owners of United States patents. The latter were "especially
handicapped" with regard to their ability to bring declaratory judgment actions as
compared with the former. The statement does not necessarily assume the existence of
more than one category of persons who were "handicapped' by the inability to sue
foreign owners of United States patents.
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opinion is void of any concern regarding a possibility of a conflict between that
court's application of § 293 and § 293's potential usurpation of the government
contacts exception in patent related suits. This second aspect is of special
importance because the National Patent court would allow § 293 to confer
personal jurisdiction over a foreign patentee in an exclusive state law dispute,
whereas the District of Columbia long-arm statute, subject to the government
contacts exception, would not support personal jurisdiction over that very same
patentee and under the very same circumstances. As such, the NationalPatent
decision could be used to circumvent the government contacts exception, and
consequently provide a solution to the inequities caused by the government
contacts exception demonstrated above.
Nevertheless, while § 293 might appear to be a solution regarding the
problem of the government contacts exception in patent ownership disputes
involving foreign patentees, its basic reasoning is flawed. First, the National
Patent opinion does not address the fact that when the right that is sued upon is
created by state law the "amenability of a foreign [defendant] to suit in a federal
court in a diversity action is determined according to the law of the state in
which the district court sits. " '22 Therefore, when the right sued upon in
federal court is based upon the laws of the District of Columbia, it is the District
of Columbia long-arm statute, subject to the government contacts exception, that
should control.'
The National Patent court, on the other hand, has taken a
patent ownership claim, which is governed exclusively by state substantive
contract law, and summarily made applicable a federal patent long-arm statute
when federal patent law was not even at issue.'
Moreover, the National
Patent decision is totally void of discussion as to whether the court's decision
might result in a conflict with the government contacts exception.
Recall that the government contacts exception has been held to preclude the
assertion of personal jurisdiction over a foreign defendant when that foreign
defendant's only contact with the District of Columbia was with the PTO."
The National Patent decision arbitrarily removes this obstacle if § 293 is used
in place of the District of Columbia long-arm statute. However, the two
concerns that spurred the conception of the government contacts exception

6 CHISUM, supra note 27, § 21.02[3], at 21-115 n.61.5.
228. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.18, at 165. See Donahue v. Far Eastern Air

Transp. Corp., 652 F.2d 1032, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1981). The Donahue court stated: "Plaintiffs have
invoked federal court subject matter competence on the basis of the parties' diversity of citizenship.
No claim arising under federal law figures in the litigation. Personal jurisdiction over [the

defendant] in these circumstances turns on state law." Id. (emphasis added).
229. Donahue, 652 F.2d at 1036. See also FRIEDENTHALET AL., supra note 1, § 3.18, at 165
(citing other authority for this proposition).
230. See supra text accompanying note 222.
231. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
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remain, regardless of whether § 293 or the District of Columbia long-arm statute
is employed. 2 In each situation, the foreign patentee's amenability to suit is
based solely upon that foreign patentee's contacts with a governmental agency,
namely the PTO, and the potential of converting the District of Columbia into
a national judicial forum still remains.
Whether the National Patent decision can withstand challenge in light of its
inherent conflict with the government contacts exception is problematic. On one
hand, if the National Patent decision can withstand challenge, those plaintiffs
who cannot meet the requisites for filing their state-law-based patent ownership
claim in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia Circuit
will be invidiously discriminated against because that claim will still be subject
to the government contacts exception to the District of Columbia long-arm
statute. 2 Consequently, that claim will be dismissed for a lack of personal
jurisdiction due to the applicability of the exception.'
Alternatively, those
plaintiffs who can file their patent ownership claim in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia will be allowed to circumvent the government
contacts exception by employing § 293."
On the other hand, if the National Patent decision is abrogated, and the §
293 option lost, then the inequity still remains in its original form. In light of
these alternate considerations, it appears that regardless of whether National
Patent stands, the inequities of the government contacts exception as applied to
tangential issues involving patent ownership will nevertheless remain.
V. A PROPOSED SOLUTION: AN EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION

While it would appear that the inequity will persist regardless of whether
National Patentis overruled, a third option can be advanced that would achieve
the highest degree of equity. Such an option would necessarily address the
inequity at its origin, thereby avoiding the above pitfalls which primarily occur
by superficially circumventing the end results of the inequity. For instance, if
an exception to the exception itself is created for a foreign patentee's
"governmental contacts" that are made solely with the PTO, then all of the
aforementioned inequities can be resolved. An exception to the exception for
contacts with the PTO would: (1) eliminate the governmental contacts
exception's conflict with the National Patent decision, allowing that decision to
remain intact; (2) apply equally to all cases whether filed in the District of

232. For a description of the two policy concerns that originated the government contacts
exception, see supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
233. See supra note 31.
234. See id.
235. See supra text accompanying notes 227-28.

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 1996

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 30, No. 3 [1996], Art. 6

1066

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 30

Columbia courts or the United States District Court for the District of Columbia;
and (3) avoid conflict with the two policy concerns voiced in the inception of the
government contacts exception because those concerns would no longer be
included in the equation.
As noted above, the primary conflict between the National Patent decision
and the government contacts exception is that the National Patent court's
expansion of the Patent Act's § 293 long-arm statute usurps the District of
Columbia's power to limit its jurisdictional reach in certain instances.'
The
inherent problem with such a situation is that a federal court is applying federal
standards and asserting jurisdiction further than the forum in which it is
sitting." 7
However, "whether a state or federal law controls makes little
difference when the state has chosen to extend its jurisdictional reach to the
limits of the Constitution."'
This would be the case if the District of
Columbia did not have the government contacts exception to its long-arm
statute. ' 9 If the exception to the exception is accepted, then it would
eliminate the conflict between § 293 and the government contacts exception by
allowing the District of Columbia to extend personal jurisdiction to the
constitutionally prescribed limits in those situations involving foreign patentees.
Consequently, the District of Columbia long-arm statute would be coextensive
with § 293, and usurpation of power would cease to exist, thereby resolving the
conflict.'
The exception to the exception would be defmed specifically so as to apply
only to foreign patentees whose sole contact is with the PTO, and who are not
otherwise amendable to suit involving the ownership of those patents because of
the government contacts exception."' Thus, the exception to the exception
would not be antithetical to the two policy concerns that prompted the original
creation of the government contacts exception. With respect to the first policy
concern, the freedom of access to the government, an exception to the exception
would apply to those foreign patentees who are involved in what essentially
would be termed as inequitable conduct by claiming ownership to a United
States patent in which ownership is contested. Prior judicial decisions in the
District of Columbia have alluded to the fact that if the contacts with the
government were in furtherance of allegedly inequitable conduct, then the
government contacts exception might not be applicable. 2 However, even if

236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.

See supra note 228 and accompanying text.
See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 1, § 3.18, at 164.
Id.
See supra section II.B.2.
See id.
See supra text accompanying notes 117-19.
See supra note 180.
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ownership disputes arise in good-faith misunderstandings, a foreign patentee is
nevertheless benefitting from the ownership of a patent in which ownership is
contested. Because a foreign patentee has purposefully availed him-or-herself
to the District of Columbia by seeking to benefit from receiving a United States
patent grant through the PTO, and subsequently appropriating the benefits of that
United States patent, that foreign patentee should be responsible for any disputes
that directly arise from such actions.
Significantly, the court in NationalPatent recognized this exact obligation,
albeit in the context of § 293, when it stated:
By registering a patent in the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, a party residing abroad purposefully avails itself of the benefits
and protections patent registration in this country affords . . . . It is
therefore fair and reasonable to require such a party to respond . . .
in federal court in our nation's capital, where the party has registered
its patents . ... 243
Again, although the court's broadening of § 293's scope was ill-advised due to
its inherent conflict with the government contacts exception, the court's
identification of the responsibilities of foreign patentees is nonetheless valid.
The notions of fairness and purposeful availment have consistently prevailed as
the cornerstones of the Supreme Court's decisions regarding the assertion of
personal jurisdiction.'
It is indisputable that non-residents who purposefully
avail themselves to the benefits of a forum should be obligated to defend suit
arising out of those contacts with that forum. 5 The obligation to defend suit
in a forum arising out of those contacts with the forum is the quid pro quo of
receiving the benefits.'

243. National Patent Dev. Cap. v. T.J. Smith & Nephew Ltd., 877 F.2d 1003, 1009-10 (D.C.
Cir. 1989).
244. See supra section II.A. See also Butler, supra note 10, at 759 ('It is clear from the

Supreme Court's articulation of the concept of minimum contacts that the application of an absolute
exception, such as the one fashioned by the Environmental Research court, conflicts with the
established legal precedent that is binding on the District of Columbia courts."). See also Jeffrey
E. Glen, An Analysis of 'Mere Presence" and Other Traditional Bases ofJurisdiction, 45 BROOKLYN
L. REv. 607, 611 (1979) (stating that intentional personal presence is the key to a fair and just
exercise of personal jurisdiction).
245. See supra section II.A.; Glen, supra note 244, at 611.
246. See supra section H.A.; Harold S. Lewis, Jr., A Brave New World for Personal
Jurisdiction: Flexible Tests Under Uniform Standards, 37 VAND. L. REv. 1, 22 (1984) ('[Tjhe
[non-resident] defendant's benefits from the forum state and his reasonable expectations of suit there
. . . serve as the ultimate measures of jurisdictional fair play.').
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Moreover, a foreign applicant is already amenable to suit regarding the core
issues of patent law. Presently, personal jurisdiction can be effectuated in cases
Additionally, in the context of the
which involve the core issues.47
government contacts exception, the filing for registration of a patent is unlike
other activities that have generally been held to fall within the exception, such
The
as news-gathering and lobbying and petitioning the government.'A
application for a patent has only incidental, if any, effects on the freedom of
access to petition the government as provided for by the First Amendment.49
Furthermore, the foreign patentee is receiving a guarantee of protection by the
United States' patent law and is allowed to appropriate that protection to his or
Conversely, lobbying or petitioning
her benefit for a fixed period of time.'
the government has no guaranteed statutory proprietary protection.
Additionally, while a uniform acceptance of the Rose decision discussed
abovez" might eliminate a foreign patentee's contacts with the PTO from the
scope of the government contacts exception and seemingly resolve the problem,
reliance on the possibility of such a uniform acceptance by the courts of the
District of Columbia of the Rose decision is too attenuated. This is especially
so in light of the trend that many of the courts in the District of Columbia
Circuit have tended to favor the EnvironmentalResearch approach, and the fact
that in nearly twenty years, the courts of the District of Columbia have failed
Alternatively, an exception to the
to formulate any bright-line rules."z
exception would remove a foreign patentee's contacts with the PTO from the
mire of confusion surrounding the government contacts exception, the Rose
decision, and the Environmental Research decision, and effectively place the
exception to the exception on the more principled grounds of purposeful

247. See 35 U.S.C. § 293 (1988).
248. See supra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
249. See United States v. Wilfred Am. Educ. Corp., No. 86-333, 1987 WL 10501, at *4
(D.D.C. Apr. 23, 1987).
Clearly the petition clause excludes certain contacts from the minimum contacts calculus
... [such as] visits to Washington to lobby Congress or to influence the rulemaking of
adjudicatory process of the agencies . . . . [However,] . . . entering into . . .
agreements and . . .complying with . . .reporting requirements, [are] not attempt[s]
to influence the discretionary process of the government .... It stretches the concept
of "petition" to apply the petition clause to ... [such] ministerial contacts. Moreover,
the "chilling" effect on actual petitions-lobbying Congress or petitioning the
executive-is non-existent because [this type of] contact[] . .. [is] not based on.
lobbying efforts.
Id.
250. See supra note 201.
251. See supra section lIH.B.
252. See supra section III. Moreover, the Rose court's reliance on the First Amendment as a
foundational basis for applying the government contacts exception may be questionable as well. See
supra note 117.
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availment, quid pro quo, and fairness. 3 Accordingly, it would not be unjust
to require that foreign non-resident applicants for United States patents be made
amenable to suit for all issues that concern that patent and the legal protection
afforded to it.
Finally, in regard to the second policy concern of transforming the District
of Columbia into a national judicial forum, the exception to the exception's
scope would necessarily be applied narrowly, only concerning those contacts
with the PTO by the foreign patentees who are not otherwise amenable to suit
in the United States regarding tangential patent issues such as ownership. This
narrow scope would not be inapposite to the concern of turning the District of
Columbia into a national judicial forum since the focus of the exception to the
exception would be on foreign patentees only, a defined and limited group of
potential defendants. Moreover, Congress has already deemed the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia as the sole tribunal to handle claims
against foreign patentees in the event that a foreign patentee neglects to appoint
a United States citizen for service of process.'
Thus, "[t]he District of
Columbia is likely to be as convenient [a forum] to a foreign patentee as
any."255

VI. CONCLUSION
In many situations, the application of a legal doctrine can become
disoriented.'
This is the case with the government contacts exception to the
District of Columbia long-arm statute. The evolution of the exception has
passed the bounds of its original purpose, and the cutting back process of its
scope must begin. The proposal offered in this Note confronts only one
particular situation in which awkward results of an expansive application of the
scope of the exception are pronounced. An exception to the government
contacts exception will provide a workable, categorical approach to an area of
law that is inconsistent due in large part to the amount of incoherent
interpretations that the government contacts exception has been exposed to
throughout its existence. This approach not only resolves an existing inequity,

253. See supra section ll.A. for a discussion of these principles.
254. See supra note 211.
255. 6 CHISUM, supra note 27, § 21.02[3], at 21-111.
256. Professor Phillip Areeda explains such a phenomenon in the context of antitrust law:
As with most instances of judging by catch-phrase, the law evolves in three stages: (1)
An extreme case arises to which a court responds. (2) The language of that response
is then applied - often mechanically, sometimes cleverly - to expand the application.
With too few judges experienced enough with the subject to resist, the doctrine expands
to the limits of its language, with little regard to policy. (3) Such expansion ultimately
becomes ridiculous, and the process of cutting back begins.
Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J.
841, 841 (1989).
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but its application provides for a more principled and manageable basis on which
to base future decisions concerning the government contacts exception.
Chad Allen Schiefelbein
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